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Since the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its so-
called “Caliphate,” the terrorist organization has demonstrated its capability and 
willingness to project force beyond its immediate area of operations in the Middle East, 
extending to Western countries. Rather than solely dispatching trained foreign fighters, in 
the United States, ISIL’s strategy has involved homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) 
with a limited range of connectivity to the group. This thesis explores the threat posed by 
a subgroup of HVEs identified as “redirected radicals,” aspiring foreign fighters who, 
when prevented by counterterrorism actions from traveling overseas, decided instead to 
alter their targeting trajectory and commit violence in their home countries.  
Through an extensive comparative case study analysis of recent ISIL-related 
violent incidents and plots in the United States, Canada, and Australia, common trends 
identified the prevalence of redirected radicals. This thesis found that policy responses to 
this phenomenon differed significantly across these three nations, using an array of legal 
authorities including undercover investigations, passport revocation, and preventative 
detention with varying degrees of effectiveness. Ultimately, this thesis determined that 
investigations involving potential redirected radicals offer unique opportunities for 
counterterrorism authorities to effectively decrease the likelihood of a domestic attack. 
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For over two years, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has 
demonstrated its willingness and increasing capability to project force beyond its 
immediate area of operations in the Middle East, carrying out complex attacks in Western 
nations, notably throughout Europe. Rather than solely dispatching trained foreign 
fighters, in the United States, ISIL’s strategy has involved homegrown violent extremists 
(HVEs) with varying degrees of connectivity to the group. This thesis explores the threat 
posed by a subgroup of HVEs, who are identified as “redirected radicals,” ISIL 
supporters who aspire to be foreign fighters abroad but, when prevented by the actions of 
counterterrorism authorities from traveling overseas, decided instead to alter their 
targeting trajectory and commit violence in their home countries. This thesis provides a 
model for understanding the prevalence of these extremist aspirants, the transformative 
danger they pose, and the counterterrorism strategies of several Western nations in 
response to this emerging threat.  
Chapter I provides a general background and establishes a framework for 
understanding the threat posed by ISIL beyond the Middle East. It explains that the 
current phase of global terrorism stemming from ISIL has raised a significant issue, as 
the United States and allied countries seek to prevent potential ISIL sympathizers from 
traveling abroad, numerous counterterrorism policies appear to be keeping violent 
extremists in their home countries without charge, which may have the unintended 
consequence of encouraging acts of terrorism in the homeland. This chapter describes the 
sources and methodology of the research used in the thesis, including a comparative case 
study of three countries with a similar ISIL-related threat environment: Canada, 
Australia, and the United States.  
Chapter II examines existing literature on the topic of ISIL’s network of 
worldwide recruits. It makes the argument that a considerable knowledge gap exists on 
the issue of aspiring foreign fighters and the threat that this specific group of extremists 
poses beyond their risk of traveling abroad and returning home for attacks. It provides a 
breakdown of historical documentation for previous conflicts drawing Western fighters 
 xiv 
and establishes patterns of behavior among those who returned to their homeland. The 
literature review concludes that research into the foreign fighter issue can be divided into 
optimistic and pessimistic camps, those who believe the threat is potentially overblown 
versus those who think it is severe. 
Chapter III begins the first part of the comparative case study analysis by focusing 
on Canada’s current foreign fighter issues, propaganda threats against the country made 
by terrorist groups, as well as its overall experience with ISIL. After exploring two high-
profile cases of violent incidents carried out by ISIL supporters, it details the Canadian 
government’s counterterrorism response. This chapter concludes by examining Canada’s 
uncommon use of preventative detention, specifically legal measures called “peace 
bonds” to contain known or suspected terrorists.  
Chapter IV continues by describing the Australian experience, the terrorism, and 
the new challenges it faces in confronting threats from ISIL, including a significant 
number of Australians who have traveled to join the group in Iraq and Syria. Three 
relevant cases involving individuals who joined ISIL overseas and two others who 
conducted violent attacks on their home soil are explored in great detail. This chapter 
concludes by reviewing the Australian government’s counterterrorism response to these 
deadly ISIL inspired operations and the nation’s use of preventative detention orders, as 
well as passport revocation. 
Chapter V is the final part of the case study. It begins by explaining the 
implications of the current threat narrative regarding potential returned ISIL foreign 
fighters in the United States. It highlights the string of ISIL-inspired violent incidents that 
have been carried out by the group’s ideological adherents in the United States and goes 
into detail on the role that redirected radicals have played in those operations. Detailed 
cases of extremists in several high-profile attacks and disrupted plots are covered in depth 
primarily using sources from unsealed court documents. Statistical information on 
terrorism prosecutions is provided to analyze the success of the U.S. counterterrorism 
approach, which has largely focused on undercover investigations.  
 xv 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with the findings of a relevant literature review, 
and the key takeaways from an extensive comparative case study analysis of three 
Western nations determined to have a similar terrorism threat environment. It identifies 
that clear opportunities exist for reform at the counterterrorism policy level, which may 
make the process of identifying the extremists at greatest risk of turning their intended 
support for ISIL overseas into violent action at home more effective. While highlighting 
areas for improvement, it provides some validation for the current investigative 
counterterrorism approach of the United States. It sheds light on the inherently dangerous 
risks of the practice of preventative detention without the corresponding intensive 
monitoring demonstrated in Canada, and to a lesser extent, in Australia. This thesis has 
made clear that not all actions taken during the course of a counterterrorism investigation 
are guaranteed to result in a positive outcome, and even the best intentions of preventing 
an extremist from fighting abroad can trigger the unintended consequence of them 
choosing to attack their countrymen and die at home.  
Ultimately, law enforcement agencies benefit by being able to control many of the 
levers that can alert an aspiring foreign fighter that their plans for overseas travel have 
been disrupted, altering their behavior. In these particular cases, the perception by a 
terrorism suspect of law enforcement inaction is likely a stronger preventative resource 
than overt action. It is paramount that counterterrorism authorities worldwide be aware of 
the danger posed by redirected radicals. 
 xvi 
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I. THE RISING RISK OF REDIRECTED RADICALS 
Since September 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has 
threatened Western countries involved in counterterrorism operations against the terrorist 
organization, primarily in Syria and Iraq.1 In furtherance of this objective, the group has 
embraced and built upon an operational strategy first developed by its predecessor and 
current rival al-Qa’ida, which encourages violent extremist sympathizers throughout 
Western Europe, the United States, and other countries it considers adversarial, to 
conduct attacks in their homeland.2 Despite calls by the group for its supporters to follow 
this strategy, it has also stressed that its inspired adherents come to the so-called 
“Khilafah” (Islamic State/Caliphate) and fight alongside its ranks whenever possible.3 
Significant numbers of young men and women in the United States and other Western 
nations remain committed to the goal of traveling overseas in an attempt to link up and 
connect with ISIL, receive training, and obtain combat experience in what has emerged 
as the principal global jihadist battlefield.4 Evidence supporting this goal flows from 
numerous counterterrorism cases, which have involved homegrown violent extremists 
(HVE) who were prevented from traveling to Iraq and Syria at various stages of action, 
preparation, and planning.5 
According to recent reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates 
that at least 250 American citizens have traveled or attempted to travel abroad to fight 
                                                 
1 Prepared Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, The Islamic State: A Persistent Threat, 
July 29, 2014 (Brian Fishman, Counterterrorism Research Fellow International Security Program at the 
New America Foundation), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140729/102590/HHRG-113-
AS00-Wstate-FishmanB-20140729.pdf. 
2 Anne Speckhard, “ISIS and the Rise of Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” Security Solutions 
Magazine, April 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274072173_ISIS_and_The_Rise_of_ 
Homegrown_Terrorism_in_the_West. 
3 Liz Fields, “Islamic State Releases ‘Eid Greetings’ Video Purporting to Show Foreign Fighters,” 
VICE, August 3, 2014.  
4 James Traub, “The Demonic Wellspring: Unlike Al Qaeda, Which Offers Victory in Some Remote 
Era, ISIS, in Occupying Territory and Declaring the Caliphate, Invites its Followers to Live in the 
Prophesied Paradise Now,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2015, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login%3 
Furl=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1663209953%3Faccountid=12702. 
5 Karen Greenberg, “By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States,” Fordham Center on National 
Security, June 25, 2015, http://centeronnationalsecurity.org/node/1366. 
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with Islamist extremists in Iraq and Syria.6 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in 
all 50 states reportedly have at least one ISIL-related case in their workload, according to 
Director James Comey.7 Many of these individuals, identified as “lone-wolves” or HVEs, 
are self-directed but often have indications of being recipients of ISIL propaganda and 
maintain at least some loose connectivity to the organization’s strategic goals.8 
Additionally, in the United States, at least 101 terrorism cases and incidents have 
involved such individuals since the emergence of ISIL.9 Among Western nations, the 
United States, Australia, France, and Canada appear to have experienced the greatest 
frequency of attacks by aspiring foreign fighters, those who seek to travel abroad and join 
the terrorist group.10 Although the general national security threat posed by ISIL to all of 
these countries is the same, each nation has taken a uniquely different approach to 
combatting this element, including but not limited to, undercover investigations, travel 
document revocation, and preventative detention measures.  
When addressing the threat of ISIL’s aspiring foreign fighters, several nations 
have rapidly moved towards policies that overtly restrict the freedom of movement of 
suspected extremists through various forms of preventative detention measures. To date, 
the United States has not followed suit; however, the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security released an extensive report in September 2015, which 
called for limiting the mobility of known and suspected extremists via discretionary 
passport revocation authority, a powerful proposed legislative action that follows the 
                                                 
6 Peter Bergen et al., ISIS in the West: The Western Militant Flow to Syria and Iraq (Washington, DC: 
New America Foundation, 2016), 10, https://www.newamerica.org/documents/1382/isis-in-the-west-
march-2016.pdf.  
7 Jim Piggot and Scott Johnson, “Suspected ISIS Terrorist Arrested in Jacksonville,” News4JAX, 
February 25, 2015, http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/suspected-isis-terrorist-arrested-in-jacksonville.  
8 Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins, and Tom Giratikanon, “Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired 
Attacks around the World,” New York Times, July 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html?_r=0. 
9 Karen Greenberg, Case by Case: ISIL Prosecutions in the United States (New York: Center on 
National Security at Fordham Law, 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183 
fea/t/577c5b43197aea832bd486c0/1467767622315/ISIS+Report+-+Case+by+Case+-+July2016.pdf.  
10 Michael Noonan and Phyl Khalil, “North American Foreign Fighters,” Journal for 
Deradicalization, 2014, http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/6. 
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similar moves of several allied governments.11 This possible course of action and 
response could be questionable and merits further exploration, especially when 
considering that several cases of ISIL-inspired Westerners who ultimately chose to 
commit violence against their home countries, rather than travel down the pathway to 
becoming a foreign fighter, appear to have included individuals who were made aware of 
limitations to their travel status.12 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The current new phase of global terrorism stemming from ISIL has brought to 
light a troubling problem, as the United States and allied countries seek to prevent 
potential ISIL sympathizers from traveling abroad, numerous counterterrorism policies 
appear to be keeping violent extremists in their home countries without charge, which 
may have the unintended consequence of encouraging acts of terrorism in the homeland. 
A substantial amount of recent literature focuses on the quantity and composition of 
Western foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq for jihad with ISIL. Overwhelmingly, 
the intelligence and U.S. law enforcement community appears heavily fixated on the risk 
of foreign fighter “returnees,” those who travel abroad, receive training from extremist 
groups, and have the potential to conduct attacks in the homeland. This fixation 
potentially risks outweighing or marginalizing the more imminent threat and proven 
danger of “aspiring foreign fighters,” who are extremists based in the United States who 
are either unable to, have failed, or are otherwise knowingly prevented from traveling 
overseas, and may alternatively choose to strike in the homeland.  
The focus on returnees likely finds its roots within the Western European 
experience with ISIL to date. Numerous mass-casualty operations including the January 
2015 Charlie Hebdo assault, the March 2016 Brussels bombings, and the November 2015 
Paris attacks, all involved extremists, some of whom had previously traveled to foreign 
                                                 
11 Michael McCaul et al., Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter 
Travel (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Committee, 2015), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf.  
12 Jason Trahan and Byron Harris, “Garland Suspect Had History with FBI Counterterror Unit,” 
WFAA ABC 8, May 4, 2015, http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/investigates/garland-suspect-had-history-
with-fbi-counterterror-unit/148894071. 
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conflict zones and connected with terrorist organizations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.13 
The prevailing narrative assumes that returned foreign fighters pose a threatening 
lethality orders of magnitude greater than those who do not travel abroad. However, the 
June 2016 shooting in Orlando, Florida, carried out by an HVE with no foreign combat 
zone training whatsoever, raises significant doubts about the accuracy of viewing the 
ISIL threat through the lens of being concerned primarily about those who travel abroad 
and return rather than those who stay home.  
Determining how these threats are understood and prioritized is an important goal 
of current U.S. counterterrorism strategy against ISIL and is a central objective of this 
thesis. Unfortunately, a considerable knowledge gap exists about the domestic 
counterterrorism response to these threats at the operational and policy level, thus 
meriting greater investigation and graduate-level research. Most troubling, a consistent 
approach for counterterrorism authorities to respond to aspiring foreign fighters also does 
not appear to exist. In some instances, which are explored in greater detail, the actions 
taken by law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada, and Australia may have 
actually played a significant contributing role in adversely impacting the behavior of an 
aspiring foreign fighter, resulting in the rapid trajectory course change of violent actions 
inward against their homeland rather than outward on a foreign battlefield. These cases 
represent the difficult counterterrorism challenge of “redirected radicals.” 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In an effort to understand the dynamics of the potential risk of attack redirection 
among ISIL’s aspiring foreign fighters, this thesis attempts to answer the following key 
questions: 
• What lessons have been learned from the recent wave of Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant-inspired attacks by returned Western foreign fighters 
and “redirected” aspiring foreign fighters? 
• How can these lessons be applied for homeland security policymakers, as 
well as the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities? 
                                                 
13 Alan Yuhas, “How Yemen Spawned the Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” The Guardian, January 14, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/14/yemen-aqap-civil-war-extremism. 
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• In the process of answering this primary inquiry, the thesis also explores 
several other subquestions, including: 
o Can the current examples of successful, failed, and foiled violent 
extremist attacks or plots in the West contribute to a deeper 
understanding and revaluation of the foreign fighter returnee threat in 
comparison to the danger posed by aspiring foreign fighters who 
become redirected radicals?14  
o What are the implications a non-interventionist law enforcement 
approach to combating ISIL’s sympathetic HVEs who seek to travel 
abroad and become foreign fighters? Would policies that do not aim to 
remove a suspect’s ability overtly to travel increase or decrease the 
likelihood of domestic attacks against Western nations? 
o What is the most effective practice model by Western law enforcement 
in countering cases of ISIL-inspired aspiring foreign fighters that 
allows for maximum intelligence collection, minimal risk to officer 
safety, and leads to the greatest likelihood of decreased redirected 
homeland attacks? 
1. Research Design and Objectives 
This thesis seeks to study several different areas of homeland security interest. 
Principally, it is a thesis about a specific group of people, ISIL’s homegrown violent 
extremists in Western nations who seek to travel abroad to Iraq and Syria, and become 
foreign fighters. With that in mind, this research centers on a subsection of multi-national 
law enforcement and intelligence cases involving some of these people as members of the 
broader terrorist organization ISIL. By developing a deeper understanding of these 
individuals, the analysis attempts to go from the micro-level to the macro-level, and 
research the response of several government counterterrorism agencies responsible for 
preventing these individuals from engaging in acts of violence.  
This research attempts to understand the motivating factors that contribute to 
otherwise externally focused extremists altering the targeting trajectory of their violence 
internally against their homeland. To gain a strong comparative understanding of the 
current threat environment and its challenges, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis 
                                                 




of the experience of at least three similar Western nations currently facing the threat of 
HVEs in addition to aspiring foreign fighters, defined as individual residents or citizens 
of a specific country who seek to travel abroad to join ISIL or Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-
Nusra Front/JN).  
These nations studied are Australia, Canada, and the United States. The two 
nations, Canada and Australia, have been selected for the dataset because they both share 
distinct similarities that give their respective counterterrorism approaches to ISIL the 
greatest chance of compatibility and relevance with the current U.S. threat environment. 
By the numbers, these countries have a comparable quantity of suspected foreign fighters, 
ranging from 120 to 250.15 Most importantly, unlike members of the European Union, 
who are currently dealing with a significant aspiring foreign fighter threat, highlighted by 
several high-profile mass-casualty operations recently carried out in France and Belgium, 
none of these three selected nations share a contiguous overland border with Iraq and 
Syria. The geographical distance, and the absence of an overland travel route between 
ISIL’s area of territorial control in Iraq and Syria and the three selected countries, is 
potentially a major limiting factor for aspiring foreign fighters. This distance requires 
Western ISIL supporters to travel by either ship or plane to reach their intended target 
destination at greater cost and difficulty than their Europe-based peers, which makes 
studying HVEs in these countries particularly interesting given their potential elevated 
susceptibility to redirection. Finally, the shared English language between these three 
nations will also help facilitate a clear analysis of the data. 
2. Selection  
The data sample consists of entirely opensource, unsealed terrorism cases from 
each of these three selected countries. With the assistance of public court documents, 
media coverage of investigations and incidents, as well as academic summaries of key 
trials, this thesis performs an inductive analysis to determine if any patterns, trends, or 
                                                 
15 This figure comes from the low estimate of the most recent media reporting on international foreign 
fighters. While the number is fluid and subject to change, it is estimated that 250 Americans have traveled 
to join ISIL in addition to 130 from Canada and 120 from Australia.  
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shared factors exist among investigative cases involving HVEs who ultimately decided to 
attempt, or successfully conduct, terrorist attacks against their home countries.  
3. Limits 
This thesis does not seek to explore the origin or evolution of ISIL. It also does 
not look to offer a policy solution for countering the group militarily in Iraq and Syria nor 
make an attempt to offer recommendations for countering the ideology of ISIL’s 
recruitment propaganda, which has resulted in the phenomenon of tens of thousands of 
Westerners traveling abroad to connect with the terrorist organization. The data has been 
researched with a fixed beginning and an end point, established to ensure that the 
collection of cases and other information can have some degree of finality to it without 
constantly needing to amend the dataset with the most recent attacks. This thesis does not 
seek to understand how an individual ISIL sympathizer becomes radicalized. Much has 
been written on the jihadist radicalization cycle. More opportunity exists instead to 
provide needed insight into the reactions by ISIL-sympathetic extremists to the policy 
actions of Western governments.  
4. Data Sources 
The data sources include quantitative datasets featuring the number of attacks 
carried out by ISIL extremists in the West. One report, which features heavily, both 
because of the statistical data it provides but also for its policy recommendations, which 
can potentially be examined as beneficial or harmful, was published in 2015 by the U.S. 
House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee.16 Additional data sources 
include expansive lists of ISIL-linked arrests that have occurred in the United States, 
including one comprehensive statistical analysis by the Center on National Security at 
Fordham University Law School.17 Court documents from numerous cases involving 
ISIL-inspired extremists have been studied. These cases include incidents occurring 
between March 2014 and July 2016, spanning just over the current two-year existence of 
                                                 
16 McCaul et al., Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. 
17 Greenberg, “By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States.” 
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ISIL. This time frame was selected because it includes the period when ISIL first became 
prominently covered in Western media outlets. It also includes the initial wave of when 
the group’s foreign operational attack strategy began to take shape, with the group’s 
leadership more actively calling for attacks by supporters in the West if they are unable to 
travel to the lands of its self-proclaimed Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. 
5. Type and Mode of Analysis 
While a case study methodology has been applied to study each of the aspiring 
foreign fighters and redirected radicals’ experiences with intelligence and law 
enforcement authorities, a policy analysis also follows in later chapters of the thesis to 
foster a clearer understanding of the response.  
In support of this project, the research is aimed at answering the following key 
preliminary questions for each of the identified “subject nations.” 
• How many foreign fighters does the nation currently estimate have joined, 
are now fighting, or are believed to have died in combat with ISIL and 
affiliated jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria? 
• What proactive law enforcement and intelligence policies, if any, are 
currently being taken to prevent ISIL sympathizers from traveling abroad 
to link up with terrorist organizations?  
• How many hostile incidents have been experienced by these governments 
in their respective homelands during the timeframe covered by the 
dataset?  
C. RELEVANCE AND GOALS  
Numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD), have conducted counterterrorism investigations 
over the last two years, some of which have led to successful arrests involving aspiring 
foreign fighters that adhere to ideology of ISIL. Analyzing the actions of the other 
Western nations, namely Canada and Australia, in responding to this problem may yield 
valuable benefits to assist in further preventing domestic attacks. These national policies 
and responses are evaluated using impact-based criteria, which examine violent incidents 
and analyze case details to determine if the individuals responsible for attacks were 
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redirected toward domestic operations. Using this approach, this thesis seeks to determine 
if a best practices model exists for intelligence-led law enforcement to apply when 
pursuing cases of aspiring ISIL foreign fighters and preventing the development of 
redirected radicals.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
ISIL is a foreign terrorist organization, based in Iraq and Syria, which has 
emerged as one of the primary threats impacting the national security of the United States 
over the last two years, rightly necessitating the increased research and study of this 
group by individuals throughout institutions of higher education, private-sector security 
firms, and the intelligence community. Despite only first receiving consistent national 
media attention in June 2014 with the group’s launch of a massive offensive against 
military forces in western and northern Iraq, a substantial amount of literature has been 
written on this foreign terrorist organization, the actions it has taken, its place in the 
broader international jihadist movement, and the violent extremists who have traveled 
from dozens of countries to join its ranks.  
This review is an in-depth analysis aimed at examining one portion of that 
literature, focusing on a major but narrow facet of ISIL, its deep bench of recruits from 
countries beyond its immediate area of operation in Iraq and Syria. These individuals, 
spanning a wide range of demographics, come largely from neighboring regional states in 
the Middle East, but increasingly have included young men and women from Western 
nations, including but not limited to Canada, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. The generally accepted term used to describe these individuals 
comprising this exodus of jihadists has been “foreign fighters.”  
To date, numerous reports have identified the problem and inherent danger of 
foreign fighters. These documents tend to be running to catch up with the latest metrics, 
often culled from media statements or public testimony provided by intelligence 
community officials, with fluid approximated numbers for suspected Westerners who 
have traveled overseas to join ISIL. In spite of this abundance of information about the 
foreign fighter problem, research on the solution is lacking, specifically on what actions 
intelligence and law enforcement communities, both within and beyond the United 
States, have taken to combat this threat. 
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A. THE “ASPIRING FOREIGN FIGHTER” RESPONSE KNOWLEDGE GAP 
Given the relatively recent nature of ISIL, an opportunity exists to create new 
knowledge through a comparative analysis of the counterterrorism policies, law 
enforcement operations, and legislative measures enacted by the Western governments 
that have been most severely impacted by the ISIL foreign fighter issue. Much attention 
has been paid to violent extremists who have joined ISIL and currently reside within its 
territorial boundaries in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere; however, comprehensive research 
studies of individuals in the West who are exploring, openly expressed a desire to join, or 
have made attempts but failed to link up with ISIL overseas, are lacking.  
These individuals are often referred to as “homegrown violent extremists,” a term 
which speaks to the location of these ISIL supporters but is lacking when it comes to 
describing their intent. In an effort to remedy this shortfall, the thesis refers to some 
HVEs as “aspiring foreign fighters,” individuals who represent a unique subsection of the 
ISIL threat picture in the West. Unfortunately, thorough research of this subsection and 
its implications on the intelligence and law enforcement community is virtually 
nonexistent. In pursuit of this research goal, the diverse pool of source material can be 
broken down into four key subcategories. 
• Historical documentation and profile analysis of foreign fighters 
• “Pessimistic” foreign fighter assessments (threat to the homeland is 
severe) 
• “Optimistic” foreign fighter assessments (homeland threat is overblown) 
• Law enforcement response actions for aspiring foreign fighter cases  
1. Historical Documentation/Profile Analysis of Foreign Fighters  
The majority of information on the ISIL foreign fighter threat falls into the first 
category of historical documentation and profile analysis of foreign fighters. Since the 
beginning of the Syrian civil war as part of the Arab Awakening in 2011, the U.S. 
government has issued several warnings, as substantial numbers of Westerners have 
traveled to combat the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Some of these individuals 
were called to defend the Muslim Umma (community of faithful believers) by fighting 
 13 
with paramilitary groups and militia not allied with ISIL and al-Qa’ida, but many others 
joined foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) to answer that call. Numerous U.S. 
government reports primarily from the House and Senate committees on homeland 
security have identified this threat as a strategic concern.18 These government findings 
are helpful in establishing a longer history of foreign fighter concerns and can draw lines 
of similar connectivity to previous jihadist conflicts where foreigners surged to fight 
alongside mujahideen in conflicts like the Soviet-Afghan War and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.19  
In addition to more expansive strategic threat assessments and reports like those 
released shortly after the rise of ISIL by the U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee, senior-level 
government officials from the nation’s primary counterterrorism agencies, including the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have regularly issued public statements at 
press conferences and provided testimony on foreign fighters. Unfortunately, most of this 
information provides a very limited dataset and is likely only accurate for the time 
immediately preceding and following when the statements were made in open-source 
media reports.  
Beyond federal government reports, the private-sector security community has 
been heavily interested in the issue of foreign fighters, with entities ranging from private 
think tanks to security consulting firms providing in-depth, big picture, analytical 
products. These products tend to serve as a good entry point or an overall backgrounder 
on this issue. For example, an article published in the October 2014 issue of Perspectives 
on Terrorism used detailed metrics to determine that foreign fighters have traveled from 
at least 81 countries to join ISIL.20 Of the thousands of foreigners that the group counts 
among its ranks, the author of this piece estimated that 2,500 are from Western nations.21  
                                                 
18 Dana Rohrabacher and Gregory Meeks, “Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 
Hearing,” Foreign Affairs Committee, September 19, 2014.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Jeanine de Roy Van Zuijdewijn, “The Foreign Fighters’ Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (October 2014): 1–15. 
21 Ibid.  
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The unfortunate drawback of metrics, and virtually every analytical study 
examining this issue, is that the information is highly time sensitive. Quantitative analysis 
of foreign fighters is framed in the exact moment when the study was set for publishing 
and very few accurate unclassified real-time tracking sources are available for the current 
number of Westerners who have actually joined and are actively fighting alongside ISIL, 
as it shifts on a near-daily basis. For example, one Bloomberg report from December 
2014 estimates that ISIL has a total of 15,000 total foreign fighters, 2,000 from 
“Western” countries and approximately 1,600 from the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany combined.22 Alternatively, a more recent source, culling data from March 
2015, estimates the number of ISIL foreign fighters at half of the 20,000 to 31,500 
militants claimed by the CIA. It maintains that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 European 
foreign fighters are among the group’s ranks.23 This range indicates either a massive 
influx of fighters or wide discrepancies in available and accurate data on this issue.  
In December 2015, the Soufan Group amended its study of foreign fighters in 
Syria and Iraq and found that in less than two years since its earlier research, foreign 
fighter figures rose to between 27,000 and 31,000 people from 86 countries.24 The 
figures in the updated study maintained that roughly 5,000 foreign fighters came from 
Western European nations while 4,700 originated in former Soviet Republics, with the 
majority traveling from North Africa and throughout the Middle East.25 Unlike most 
reports, this study went so far as to speculate the percentage of foreign fighters who 
actually return to Western countries, claiming that 20–30 percent of foreign fighters have 
done so.26 What it did not account for is the diversity in foreign fighter returnees, namely 
                                                 
22 Cam Simpson, “What Happens When Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters Return?” Bloomberg 
Business, December 1, 2014.  
23 Rik Coolsaet, “What Drives Europeans to Syria and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case,” 
Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, March 2015. 
24 Richard Barret et al., Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters 
into Syria and Iraq (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
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those willing to participate in attacks against their homeland and those ostensibly 
disenchanted with the group’s actions, ideology, and their experience upon returning. 
Some of the reports in this subsection have included efforts to provide profile 
analyses of Westerners who have joined ISIL’s ranks. Although well intentioned, the 
problem with these assessments is that they seek to find anecdotal commonality and run 
the risk of making broad generalizations to link the individual stories of hundreds of 
Westerners. The profiles of these individuals may include detailed information, such as 
socioeconomic status, age, race, etc., but with a group like ISIL, which has pulled 
extremist Muslim recruits from a broadly diverse spectrum of class, sex, and age 
backgrounds, this sort of information becomes less helpful, especially in a research effort 
geared towards providing a best practices approach to counterterrorism policy.  
Reports in this category also tend to vary according to the analytical lens being 
used to study ISIL by the author. While the aforementioned documents are primarily 
from the perspective of private-sector analysts and academic research experts, documents 
have also been published by military-centric organizations, such as a 2014 report entitled 
Confronting the Islamic State by the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute. This report, 
which principally examines ISIL’s actions on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, only 
tangentially touches upon the ISIL foreign fighters’ threat as a local issue that must first 
and foremost be addressed locally by the Iraqi military and vetted Syrian revolutionary 
forces.27  
2. Pessimistic Foreign Fighter Assessments 
A preliminary review of the literature has confirmed a deep fissure in the 
terrorism analysis community over the danger posed by ISIL’s roster of Western foreign 
fighters. This issue is significant, as illustrating this very real divide can challenge the 
way a reader thinks about the widely accepted and repeated narrative in the media over 
the severity of this threat for the United States. For the purposes of this research, the 
authors on both sides of this debate have been broken down into foreign fighter 
                                                 
27 Andrew Terrill, Confronting the ‘Islamic State:’ Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of 
ISIS (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2014).  
 16 
“pessimists” and “optimists.” The pessimists tend to present the argument that Western 
foreign fighters, broadly described as young passport-holding Muslim males who adhere 
to ISIL and other extremist groups, from nations like Canada, France, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, represent a clear and present danger to the 
national security of the United States.  
The narrative that these sources affirm is one that portrays foreign fighters as 
temporary guests, individuals who seek to join ISIL specifically to gain fighting 
experience in a jihadist field of battle, who will then take their newly acquired skillset 
(small-arms training, explosives manufacturing expertise, tactical experience, etc.), return 
to their homeland, and conduct terrorist operations against their countrymen. It is 
understandable that this popular narrative has taken hold, as it was stated early on by U.S. 
President Barack Obama during a September 2014 address to the United Nations aimed 
at passing a resolution against ISIL. This address aimed at garnering the support of 
international leaders, came on the heels of the terrorist organization making a massive 
and swift territorial control sweep throughout much of Syria and northern Iraq. The 
address and the foreign fighter returnee narrative rightly helped drive home the urgency 
of the threat posed by the group beyond its immediate area of operations in the Middle 
East.28  
Numerous counterterrorism researchers hold this pessimistic view, which is to be 
expected given the natural tendency for intelligence specialists to think in terms of worst-
case scenarios. For example, Evan Kohlmann, a private-sector analyst and founder of the 
jihadist monitoring and consulting company Flashpoint Global Partners, wrote an article 
in a September 2014 issue of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point’s 
Sentinel, which argued the pessimistic case. Kohlmann argues, via a detailed analysis of 
case studies and jihadist social media communications, the role that Western foreign 
fighters have played in both ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra.29 Kohlmann assesses that the 
likelihood of foreign fighters returning to commit attacks is high and expresses 
                                                 
28 Howard LaFranchi, “President Obama Wins Broad UN Backing on Resolution to Curb Foreign 
Fighters,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 2014.  
29 Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri, “Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, September 29, 2014. 
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skepticism about the theory that many Western recruits will be killed in jihadist combat 
abroad or be unable to re-enter their home countries because of watch lists or passport 
bans.30 
Testimony by Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), before the House Homeland Security Committee in February 2015, 
shows the enduring message of foreign fighter pessimists even in spite of the lack of a 
documented case of a returned ISIL foreign fighter conducting an attack against the 
United States.31 He argues that the “flow of foreign fighters and the threat they could 
pose upon return to their home countries” is one of the “most pressing concerns” for the 
intelligence community.32 His testimony maintains that the rate of travelers who went to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years pales in 
comparison to the rates of extremist travel to Syria.33 It provides insight into potential 
gateways that foreign fighters could use to facilitate an attack by highlighting Turkey’s 
visa-free travel agreement with 69 governments, limiting the requirement for traveler 
screening, and cites visa-free travel throughout the European Union (EU).34 
3. Optimistic Foreign Fighter Assessments 
Assessments of the ISIL foreign fighter threat that are “optimistic” tend to be in 
the minority of current literature on the topic. These sources generally maintain that the 
threat of Westerners who aspire, or successfully manage to travel abroad to join the 
terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria, and return to the homeland to conduct attacks, is 
remote. Some authors, including Chams Eddine Zaougui and Pieter Van Ostaeyen, go as 
far as to state that the U.S. government’s obsession with this threat is overblown and 
                                                 
30 Kohlmann and Alkhouri, “Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” 
31 Yourish, Watkins, and Giratikanon, “Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks around the 
World.” 
32 Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent Islamist 
Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror (2015) (Nicholas Rasmussen 
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
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dangerous.35 A common theme among the authors of this category is that foreign fighters 
are not visitors, rather, they are residents. These individuals seek to join ISIL to build 
lives in the so-called Islamic State, to establish homes for their families, and to take part 
in jihad against the immediate near-enemy that threatens the area ISIL primarily controls 
in Iraq and Syria.  
Of the optimist subsection of literature, the strongest and most credible voice is 
Thomas Hegghammer in his piece “Should I Stay or Should I Go.” Hegghammer’s paper 
is extensive and thoroughly researched compared to the majority of other more narrowly 
focused pieces. He argues that most extremists do not leave their homeland for foreign 
jihadist battlefields with the intention of returning home for a domestic attack and 
attempts to turn the traditional narrative of foreign fighters on its side by providing 
empirical data.36 Hegghammer creates a framework of “domestic fighters” and “foreign 
fighters.”37 The most powerful statistical finding in his research is that only one out of 
every nine (11%) foreign fighters who return from conflict overseas, appear to commit 
attacks or plot violence.38  
4. Law Enforcement Response Actions for Aspiring Foreign Fighter 
Cases 
The previous three subsections of the current literature on ISIL’s foreign fighters 
are necessary to provide context and establish the nations currently confronted with 
threats from violent extremists. Unfortunately, given the relatively short amount of time 
that ISIL has existed, and the unprecedented effectiveness of its social media recruitment 
campaign, many Western nations have not yet publicly articulated policy documents on 
the appropriate investigative procedures and actions to prevent aspiring foreign fighters 
from redirecting attacks against the homeland when unable to travel overseas to join 
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International New York Times, July 30, 2014.  
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ISIL. Government leaders and intelligence agency heads have broadly articulated the 
mission of combating ISIL supporters with any and all means necessary and authorized 
by law, but these general statements do little to provide clarity on the best practices that 
prevent terrorist attacks from occurring on domestic soil outside of ISIL’s geographic 
sphere of influence.  
One fissure point that appears throughout the responses of Western nations, such 
as Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, is whether or not aspiring foreign 
fighters, who have not committed any overt acts in support of terrorism, short of perhaps 
stating their desire to travel to Iraq and Syria, should be permitted to go or be prevented 
from leaving their home countries at all costs. These costs, in some cases, have included 
the extremists choosing to take violent action against their home country when prevented 
from leaving it. For example, some sources, including U.S. Congressman Tom Latham 
and FBI Director James Comey, have cited the value of preventing aspiring foreign 
fighters from traveling.39  
Due to the absence of clearly articulated counterterrorism policy guidelines, 
tracing specific case studies becomes an important way of understanding how impacted 
governments respond to the threat of aspiring foreign fighters. While some of these 
examples are more conventional forms of response, a subset of the literature advocates 
more unorthodox and controversial solutions to the ISIL foreign fighter issue. For 
example, a testimonial from retired General John Allen argues that outreach, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration of potentially thousands of young people who have 
joined ISIL is vital to countering the terrorist organization.40 
Limited but insightful literature is available regarding the experience of the 
British government to the ISIL foreign fighters’ issue. The United Kingdom authorized 
the use of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) with enhanced 
limitations and “location constraints” to mitigate the threat posed by those aspiring to join 
                                                 
39 U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, With Threats to U.S. Homeland Increasing, Latham 
Urges Limiting Travel of Those Americans Seeking to Help ISIS & Terror Groups (2014) (Tom Latham, 
House Appropriations Homeland Security Committee). 
40 Sakar Dibya, “Countries Need to Rehabilitate Islamic State Foreign Fighters, Special US Envoy 
Stresses,” Fierce Homeland Security, June 4, 2015. 
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ISIL.41 Ostensibly, this strategy may have been the most successful to date when 
compared to other selected Western nations including Australia, Canada, France, and the 
United States given that it has not suffered any significant attacks since ISIL’s major 
offensive in June 2014, despite having a population of 760 foreign fighters and an 
estimated 350 known or suspected returnees.42 Beyond the United Kingdom’s approach, 
the Canadian government’s response to the foreign fighter issue is probably the most 
important to consider because it appears that Canada’s domestic counterterrorism policies 
may have already resulted in at least two acts of “redirected” terrorism involving two 
aspiring foreign fighters who in October 2014 chose instead to attack their homeland 
when prevented from traveling overseas; cases that are explored in greater detail in 
Chapter III.43  
In conclusion, a comprehensive review of current literature highlights a broad 
spectrum of studies from the public and private-sector focusing on the threat posed by 
ISIL, including detailed analyses of foreign fighters who have been drawn to the terrorist 
organization. The review also revealed a debate in the academic community over the 
significance of the foreign fighter returnee threat. This one element of the ISIL threat 
environment, however, is rarely explored in greater depth when it comes to cases of 
aspiring foreign fighters and merits greater research. Historical pieces and strategic 
overviews provide detail on the origins of ISIL, but a clear knowledge gap remains for 
understanding the phenomenon of redirected radicals, cases where these individuals 
elected to pursue violence on their home soil rather than overseas when prevented from 
traveling abroad, and the response actions taken by governments to mitigate this danger.  
                                                 
41 Nicholas Watt and Alan Travis, “New Powers to Tackle ISIS Threat: Cameron Says Measures 
Needed to Combat ‘Greater and Deeper Threat to Security Than We Have Known,” The Guardian, August 
30, 2014. 
42 Barret et al., Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria 
and Iraq. 
43 Noonan and Khalil, “North American Foreign Fighters.” 
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III. CANADA’S FOREIGN FIGHTER CONUNDRUM  
The phenomenon of individuals leaving their countries of residence to 
engage in foreign conflicts is not new. Canada and many other countries 
have experienced this for decades. However, the need to address the threat 
these extremist travelers pose both to home countries and to the countries 
to which they travel has become more pressing, with their participation in 
conflicts such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.44  
~Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, 2014  
For every individual that we prevent, every extremist that we prevent from 
going overseas to engage in extremist activity, is one more individual that 
we have to investigate closely because they’re radicalized to the point that 
they want to leave.45  
~Jeff Yaworski, Deputy Director of Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, 2014  
 
A. THE ISIL THREAT TO CANADA 
The first nation to be explored in this comparative analytical study is Canada. 
This chapter provides a historic overview of the terrorism threat faced by Canada and the 
new challenges posed by ISIL. Two high-profile violent incidents carried out by ISIL-
inspired extremists are reviewed in great detail to understand the approach and response 
actions of law enforcement and intelligence authorities in addressing this threat. Finally, 
this chapter reviews the unique judicial tool of peace bonds, which have been utilized in 
several terrorism-related cases over the last two years.  
The U.S.’ friendly neighbor to the north is not commonly associated with the 
thought of terrorism, and violent extremism is rarely a phrase that first comes to mind 
when thinking of the country. Despite this perception, the nation of Canada has 
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experienced its fair share of violent extremist attacks, including a history of hostility 
against civilians from an array of malevolent actors including domestic terrorists, militant 
Sikh extremists, and nationalist entities, such as the Quebec Liberation Front (QLF).46 
However, in the nearly 15 years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, where 26 of the 
fatalities were Canadian citizens, the threat of violent extremism inspired by foreign 
jihadist terrorist organizations has grown to become the primary concern among 
Canadian law enforcement and intelligence authorities.47  
The most recent public reporting indicates that the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) has tracked an estimated 180 Canadian citizens who are currently 
believed to be engaged with foreign terrorist organizations in conflict zones worldwide, 
including Iraq and Syria.48 While these individuals bolster the often-discussed threat of 
foreign fighters overseas, a principal investigative priority for the Canadian government 
is at least 60 persons with previous foreign travel and potential contact with terrorist 
entities who have returned home to Canadian soil.49 The background, geographical 
origin, and extent of activities among this group of extremists are not homogenous, with 
some individuals reportedly involved in direct combat, training, financial support, 
propaganda dissemination, social media promotion, and plot development.50 Further, 
those allured to ISIL are not distinguished by their sex, as evidenced by a subset of eight 
to 12 Canadian young women who have, according to Canadian government reports, 
traveled to Iraq and Syria to become “jihadist brides,” in some documented cases, even 
giving birth to children of members of the terrorist group.51 
                                                 
46 Alan Gomez, “A Look at Terrorist Attacks in Canada,” USA Today, October 22, 2014, http:// 
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Foreign fighter returnees and homegrown violent extremists understandably pose 
a serious concern for the Canadian government, as these individuals represent the most 
proximal near-term threat. Speaking to the prioritization of domestic ISIL extremists 
versus foreign fighters, Michel Coulombe, the Director of CSIS, recently stated, “By 
talking about the number of people who are overseas, we are not thinking about people 
who are either prevented from traveling or have no intention of traveling but are here in 
Canada and are actually involved in threat-related activities.”52  
Coulombe’s statement recognizes that foreign intelligence monitoring and kinetic 
military operations in ISIL-controlled territory may be the assumed route for combating 
foreign fighters overseas, but proactively mitigating the threat of aspiring foreign fighters 
and individuals on Canadian soil who have been radicalized, inspired, or otherwise 
supported by ISIL, demands an innovative intelligence-led response wielding effective 
judicial tools. Some of these measures are explored later in this chapter; however, it is 
important first to understand that manner in which the threat of aspiring foreign fighters 
who become redirected radicals in Canada has manifested to date.  
B. CANADA IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF ISIL PROPAGANDA  
On September 21, 2014, major Western media outlets widely covered a 
propaganda statement released by ISIL. While the terrorist organization had been 
regularly promulgating extremist material in prior months, the message of this 42-minute 
statement received an unusual degree of attention for a group that at the time was a new 
player to most Americans. The video release, which was also translated into English, 
featured Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the chief spokesperson of ISIL, who has been 
reported to be one of the highest priority targets for the ongoing military campaign 
against the group.53 In his remarks, al-Adnani directly threatened Western nations, 
including Canada, stating: 
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If you can kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the 
spiteful and filthy French—or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other 
disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State...kill him in 
any manner or way however it may be.54 
The statement did not go unnoticed by the Canadian government; the nation’s 
conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper directed his administration to issue a press 
release, which condemned al-Adnani’s remarks while affirming the nation’s commitment 
to multi-national military efforts to degrade and destroy the group overseas.55 Despite 
these efforts, propaganda in the modern age of social media is a stubborn and resilient 
thing. Once the message is out, it spreads rapidly. In Canada’s case, it would appear that 
al-Adnani’s call for attacks may have fallen upon the ears of exactly the audience he had 
hoped it would find.  
1. Martin Couture-Rouleau  
Less than one month after al-Adnani’s statement, on October 20, 2014, an ISIL 
sympathizer named Martin Couture-Rouleau deliberately rammed his vehicle into two 
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members in Quebec, killing one before he was ultimately 
shot and killed by responding authorities. Rouleau was a 25-year-old Canadian who 
reportedly converted to Islam in 2013 and went by the name “Ahmad the Converted” on 
social media.56 It is important to note that his conversion to Islam before the attack 
provides little specific understanding of when he came to adhere to the violent extremist 
worldview espoused by ISIL.  
The two targeted military servicemen were identified as Warrant Officer Patrice 
Vincent who succumbed to his wounds and an unnamed soldier who was injured but 
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survived the assault.57 The attack took place in broad daylight and involved the assailant, 
surveilling his target, a shopping center in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, for roughly 
two hours before driving his vehicle into the military members, one of whom was in 
uniform.58 The shopping center was located proximal to a Quebec government office that 
provided services to military personnel.59 Following the vehicle strike, Couture-Rouleau 
fled the scene and led responding authorities on a chase before he ultimately lost control 
of his car. It is possible that Couture-Rouleau planned to continue his attack, as reports 
stated that he exited his vehicle brandishing a large bowie knife before police at the scene 
opened fire on him and killed him.  
Unfortunately, dead men tell no tales, and in the case of Couture-Rouleau, no 
public record exists of the exact motivation behind his attack. No martyrdom video. No 
statement of intent meant to be discovered by authorities after the incident. Given that the 
only fatality in this incident was a uniformed member of the Canadian armed services, 
and the assailant’s attempt to target officers following the car chase, it stands to reason 
that Couture-Rouleau acted with the clearest intention of deliberately murdering military 
and law enforcement personnel, two of the three specific target sets advocated by ISIL’s 
al-Adnani in his earlier propaganda release.60  
In the aftermath of Couture-Rouleau’s actions, once the likelihood of terrorism 
became apparent, it was later revealed that the attacker had been under what one account 
described as “sporadic surveillance” by the Canadian government, with the implication 
that Couture-Rouleau was one of an estimated 130 individuals in Canada suspected of 
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being involved or linked to terrorism.61 Official statements by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) also claimed that he was one of 90 people being monitored by 
the RCMP as part of 63 national security investigations, which were ongoing as of 
October 2014. However, no clarification or further detail was provided after the attack as 
to of what that monitoring consisted.62 Fully understanding the extent of this monitoring, 
as well as the actions and tools involved ranging from listening to communications, 
viewing publicly available social media activity, tracking via a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) device, or performing 24-hour-surveillance, etc., is vital in determining 
how this attack was able to occur.  
A review of post-incident press reporting on Couture-Rouleau also revealed an 
interesting detail about his case. While a well-established precedent of homegrown 
violent extremist lone offenders being viewed as “unremarkable” persons with little if 
any criminal history exists, Couture-Rouleau’s case appears to demonstrate a counter-
example to that line of thought.63 He was not an unremarkable person in the sense that he 
was not an unknown entity to law enforcement and intelligence authorities in Canada. As 
discussed earlier, at least four months prior to carrying out his vehicular assault, Couture-
Rouleau was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation.64 The RCMP was made 
aware of suspicious radical content on his Facebook and Twitter page, including the 
image of the black Shahada (Islamic declaration of faith) flag that has been coopted by 
ISIL, which along with other extremist postings, led authorities to determine that he was 
an aspiring foreign fighter, intent on traveling overseas to join a terrorist organization.65  
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In July 2014, the RCMP arrested him at Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
International Airport as he prepared to board a flight to Turkey.66 Following his arrest, 
Rouleau was reportedly listed as a “high-risk traveler,” and had his passport revoked, an 
action of which he was made aware. Lacking sufficient evidence, Canadian authorities 
did not charge Couture-Rouleau with any terrorism-related crimes, and although it 
appears that authorities did keep tabs him periodically, including a meeting with police 
on October 9, 2014, he was not the subject of constant surveillance.67 During this 
meeting, RCMP authorities claimed that the discussion was “very positive” without any 
observable indicators that Couture-Rouleau was considering an imminent act of 
violence.68 This discussion may indicate an effort on his part to deceive authorities 
deliberately who he knew were already aware of his extremist leanings. Alternative 
efforts by Canadian law enforcement included attempts to get Couture-Rouleau’s parents 
and a local religious leader to speak with him.69 The important element of this approach 
is that in the absence of being able to charge the known terrorism suspect, the law 
enforcement strategy in practice was designed to wait and contain rather than to monitor 
continuously and interdict.  
Although authorities initially determined that Couture-Rouleau was not connected 
to any other terrorists, a Canadian teenager from Montreal who was convicted on 
terrorism-related charges in December 2015 was found to be in contact with the attacker 
via Twitter before the assault.70 Additionally, in Couture-Rouleau’s case, Canadian 
media reports claim he was embroiled in a child custody case with his ex-wife who was 
seeking to prevent him from seeing his child reportedly because he converted to Islam, 
although no reports indicate that he openly advocated violence. Financial circumstances 
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may have played a role in his decision to conduct the assault, as he had reportedly 
declared bankruptcy seven months prior to the attack.  
Numerous Canadian government officials condemned the attack, and some, 
including the nation’s Foreign Affairs Minister, went so far as to claim that that law 
enforcement officials could have done nothing to prevent the deadly operation; but is this 
statement accurate? Extensive continuous surveillance, while costly and time consuming, 
could potentially have picked up on unusual activity by Rouleau, specifically when he 
was performing hostile per-operational surveillance on the Canadian service members. 
The decision to pull his passport after being arrested in July 2014 may have also been an 
action, which at the very least, if done covertly, could have not made the individual feel 
that he was trapped in a country against which he had so clearly become radicalized. 
Finally, as some law enforcement leaders have claimed, inadequate budgetary funding for 
the nation’s intelligence collectors and analytical entities likely forced a prioritization for 
individuals with clear and demonstrated indicators of imminent violent action rather than 
the more subtle signs apparent in Couture-Rouleau’s case.  
2. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau 
Only two days later, another extremist espousing ISIL’s ideology named Michael 
Zehaf-Bibeau staged an attack in Ottawa, opening fire at the Canadian National War 
Memorial where he killed one soldier before continuing his shooting rampage in the 
Parliament building nearby. Although armed with a rifle rather than a vehicle and a knife, 
the 32-year-old Canadian and Libyan dual citizen began his attack in a similar fashion to 
Couture-Rouleau, deliberately targeting a uniformed Canadian Armed Forces Corporal 
named Nathan Cirillo who was guarding the monument.71  
Another shared element has emerged in Bibeau’s case. On October 2, 2014, he 
visited the Libyan embassy in Ottawa to renew his passport, which had been issued in 
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2000 but expired while he was in Canada.72 A government official working at the Libyan 
embassy observed some general suspicious behaviors exhibited by Zehaf-Bibeau, mostly 
things being somewhat off about his attire and mannerisms but nothing outwardly 
indicative of extremism or violence.73 Reports also stated that his personal identifying 
information had some suspicious irregularities. The most significant was that his 
Canadian driver’s license listed him as “Michael” rather than his name, Abdel, which 
appeared on his original Libyan passport.74 Due to these irregularities, it appears that 
Zehaf-Bibeau’s name was forwarded to Canadian authorities, although the extent of that 
information and any follow-up action remains unclear.  
Zehaf-Bibeau had previously traveled to Libya where he had family connections 
and had an explicit desire to return to the country, purportedly because he had family 
there. However, given the aforementioned issues, the Libyan embassy elected not to 
renew his passport at the time of his visit. This action, which effectively prevented him 
from traveling with Libyan documentation, was the exact opposite of what he had hoped 
for when he entered the embassy. Personnel at the diplomatic building informed him that 
it would take at least three to four weeks to move forward with his application, a position 
that he opposed. The RCMP’s Commissioner, Bob Paulson, publicly stated that Zehaf-
Bibeau was in the process of applying for a Canadian passport as well.75  
Also like Couture-Rouleau, Zehaf-Bibeau was not an unremarkable figure; he was 
a known entity to Canadian law enforcement with an extensive criminal background 
including multiple arrests in Quebec and Vancouver for various illegal drug charges, 
robbery, and other crimes.76 In the days after the attack, conflicting accounts state that 
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Zehaf-Bibeau was also designated a “high-risk traveler,” although Canadian authorities 
discredited those claims. Although Zehaf-Bibeau clearly was not considered an imminent 
threat to Canadian national security, a distinct possibility existed that he had, on some 
lower level, triggered concerns about his potential extremism within the Canadian 
intelligence and law enforcement community. One of the most revealing details in this 
case is that residents at a shelter where the attacker stayed at in the days leading up to the 
shooting reportedly claimed that Zehaf-Bibeau believed that his ability to travel freely 
was limited and that he was on a no-fly list.77  
In the week following the terrorist attack in Ottawa, Zehaf-Bibeau’s mother 
published a letter that aimed to portray her son’s deadly actions as those of a person 
afflicted with mental illness rather than a methodical member of ISIL. Beyond the 
emotional depiction of an estranged mother’s loss, the letter also shed some light on 
Zehaf-Bibeau’s difficult experience obtaining travel paperwork. She specifically wrote of 
his passport application continuously “being held up,” implying a greater degree of 
scrutiny and difficulty in the handling of his Canadian passport than was previously 
discussed by the RCMP.78 The words she used to describe why her son acted so violently 
were even more telling: “He was mad and felt trapped so the only way out was death.”79  
3. Canada’s Response 
Although the deadly assaults by Martin-Couture Rouleau and Michael Zehaf-
Bibeau were not connected, the attacks were the first successful ISIL-related terrorist 
operations to target Canadian soil directly since the emergence of the group and the first 
Canadian deaths from violent jihadist extremism since September 11, 2001. Furthermore, 
the proximity of Zehaf Bibeau’s operation in Ottawa, which put the lives of Canadian 
government leaders in peril, appears to have left a deep mark on the Canadian 
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government and motivated an increasingly aggressive prosecutorial approach with a 
greater willingness to combat terrorism in Canada with unconventional judicial measures.  
4. Peace Bonds 
In the nearly 15 years since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and Canada have 
responded to terrorism in different ways. In several areas, it appears that the Canadian 
government has had to play catch up in developing an effective organizational 
infrastructure able both to collect and analyze threat intelligence while coordinating with 
law enforcement agencies the resources necessary to take action against known or 
suspected violent extremists. For example, prior to the recently authorized Anti-
Terrorism Act, which was passed in June 2015, the CSIS was essentially a disseminating 
organization, responsible for liaising and connecting intelligence partners without being 
legally empowered to take action. The new law now allows the country to take 
meaningful disruptive actions against terrorism suspects including limitations on an 
individual’s travel, finances, and communications.80 The escalated use of new judicial 
tools also appears to be a reaction to the two October 2014 attacks indicating the 
newfound emphasis within the Canadian government on countering possible threats with 
disruptive actions well before a typical attack plotting cycle begins. 
Given the emergence of ISIL-related terrorist activities in Canada over the last 
two years, the government, specifically the Public Prosecution Service of Canada 
(PPSC), has taken several unprecedented steps in dealing with suspected sympathizers of 
the terrorist organization while on Canadian soil. These actions, however, have been 
based on a strategy of proactive action and prevention based on inchoate acts; prior to 
individuals traveling overseas to join and train with ISIL or taking other actions to further 
domestic attack plots.  
One measure, which has increasingly been utilized by the Canadian courts, is a 
rather unusual tool known as a “peace bond” preventatively to limit a suspected 
extremist’s activities. These tools are not without controversy and have been heavily 
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criticized by civil rights activists, some of whom view the measures as unduly “invasive 
strictures.”81 The concern is understandable, as the very concept of punishment, in any 
form and regardless of its severity, prior to a crime actually taking place has long placed 
a heavy burden of proof on law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Potentially as a 
nominal response to this concern, the Canadian government regularly refers to peace 
bonds, which are legally authorized under section 810.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 
as “preventative measures” rather than criminal charges.82  
Under the newly passed Bill C-51, a major piece of counterterrorism legislation 
ushered in by Canada’s former conservative government that has been the focus of 
intense debate over the last year, peace bonds were significantly impacted. Specifically, 
the new law moved to lower substantially the legal threshold necessary to request the 
implementation of a peace bond, moving from the criterion of certainty—the fear or 
suspicion that a person will commit a terrorism-related offense—to the criterion of 
determined possibility that they may commit a terrorism-related offense.83 It may seem 
like a minimal change in the semantic text of the law, but it has the potential to have a 
sweeping effect on the frequency with which these bonds can be requested to the point 
where this legal tool now appears to be regularly used as an initial option during a 
counterterrorism investigation, rather than a last resort. Another semantic change of note 
in the legislation is that under the updated Criminal Code’s “fear of terrorism offense” 
statute, terrorist suspects may be arrested if the act of detaining an individual is 
determined to be likely rather than necessary to prevent violent extremist activity.84  
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The duration of peace bonds was also expanded from a maximum of two years to 
five years. Violation of the terms of the peace bonds may now automatically result in 
imprisonment of up to four years in prison.85 
Despite the ostensibly lower threshold for evidence collection when compared to 
a counterterrorism trial in the United States, the issuance of a peace bond under Canadian 
law is not arbitrary and the process is not taken lightly. Similar to the United States, the 
filing of terrorism-related legal measures is complex and requires multiple levels of 
official approval. Peace bonds require an intelligence or law enforcement lead for the 
initial request, followed by the consent and approval of the nation’s Attorney General, 
and ultimately, the authorization of a provincial court judge to be implemented fully.86  
a. A Peace Bond in Action—Merouane Ghalmi 
The simple fact is that peace bonds are a highly uncommon judicial tool, and as 
such, virtually every time they have been implemented in terrorism matters has been a 
high-profile development in Canada, generating justifiable public concern. Peace bonds 
offer the opportunity for the accused essentially to accept less severe, but by no means 
insignificant, limitations on their freedom for a temporary period of time. As opposed to a 
standard court process in the United States or a plea bargain where evidence of criminal 
activity is presented, the individuals accused willingly must agree to adhere to the peace 
bond based on unproven suspicion rather than go to trial facing imprisonment and a 
lifelong criminal record. Peace bonds were initially not the purview of terrorism and were 
mostly used in domestic violence and gang-related cases.87 Under fear of facing far more 
severe criminal penalties, suspected violent extremists living in Canada have at several 
times, in high-profile “pre-crime” cases, been offered peace bonds as a form of plea-
bargaining. 
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The first terrorism-related peace bond linked to an individual suspected of being 
an ISIL sympathizer was signed in Quebec in March 2015, and since that time, they have 
been implemented on at least 10 occasions.88  
The case of Merouane Ghalmi, a 22-year-old male from Montreal, offers one 
example of how a peace bond is implemented and what the consequences are in an ISIL 
case. Following an investigation, which led Canadian intelligence and law enforcement 
authorities to believe that Ghalmi may commit a terrorism offense, he was offered the 
opportunity to sign a peace bond. Ghalmi ultimately decided to do so, and as a result, his 
movements were heavily restricted and he was willingly subject to and aware of 
continuing government surveillance. By agreeing to the terms of the peace bond, Ghalmi 
was also fully prohibited from travel, required to hand over his passport, and was banned 
from communication with anyone in Syria or any individuals known or suspected to be 
linked to terrorists.  
Ghalmi was also barred from consulting or researching extremist materials for 
political violence or religious radicalism. Further, he was ordered to wear a GPS tracking 
device and submit passwords to all electronic devices to the RCMP’s Integrated National 
Security Enforcement Team (INSET). Finally, for a period of 12 months, Ghalmi was 
prohibited from having a cellphone or making any contact with individuals with criminal 
records.89 
b. When Peace Bonds Fail—Aaron Driver  
In terms of cross applicability for the United States, the Canadian use of peace 
bonds appeared to have been initially effective for several months at preventing attacks 
on Canadian soil, as none of the known individuals subject to these agreed upon mobility 
restrictions carried out an act of violence against their home country.  
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This dynamic changed dramatically on August 10, 2016 in Strathroy, Canada, 
when the FBI alerted Canadian counterterrorism authorities to an apparent martyrdom 
video featuring an ISIL supporter masked in a balaclava speaking fluent English and 
threatening an imminent attack against the country.90 RCMP authorities acted on this 
information, identified the individual, and rapidly responded to a residence where the 
suspect entered a taxi and quickly detonated an improvised explosive device when 
confronted by authorities.91 He and the taxi driver were injured in the blast, and police 
officers, reportedly faced with the threat of another IED, ultimately opened fire and killed 
the suspect.92 The individual responsible for that video and the device was identified as 
Aaron Driver, a 24-year-old Canadian citizen, born and raised in the country; he agreed 
to the terms of a peace bond in February 2015.93 
While the investigation into this case is ongoing, several troubling details have 
already become clear. Aaron Driver was a known extremist who had previously made 
public statements of support for ISIL attacks against Western nations, and most 
importantly, had expressed a desire to travel abroad to join the ranks of the terrorist 
organization.94 These overt actions likely brought him to the attention of Canadian 
counterterrorism authorities who ultimately determined that requiring Driver to comply 
with the restrictions of a peace bond was the best approach toward mitigating his 
potential threat.  
Driver’s final intent is also clear. He constructed an improvised explosive device 
and prepared a martyrdom video, an act, which in and of itself, demonstrates his full 
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commitment and willingness to die in the operation he planned to carry out. Canadian 
media reports claimed that Driver sought to conduct a suicide bombing in a crowded 
urban public area, with the aim of causing a massive loss of life.95 
The most concerning elements in this case involve the specific details of Driver’s 
peace bond limitations. Driver was not under 24-hour surveillance and his initial order to 
wear a GPS monitoring bracelet was withdrawn. While he was prohibited from operating 
a mobile device or a computer, he was only required to check in with authorities in 
person once during the middle, and again, at the end of every month.96  
Aaron Driver was killed while in possession of an explosive device, which means 
that despite being subject to a peace bond, he was able to acquire the precursor materials 
necessary to build a bomb. The terrorist plot that he sought to conduct was indeed 
prevented, but at the very latest stage possible, and at potential severe risk to the lives of 
police officers and civilians in the surrounding community. It is clear that, in this case, 
movement and behavioral limitations enforced by a peace bond were present; however, 
the requirement and mechanisms necessary for the continuous monitoring of a known 
extremist with prior overt support for violence and a willingness to travel to a conflict 
zone, were not.  
It is difficult to determine if the Canadian authorities would have been able to 
prevent this attack without receiving timely intelligence from its counterterrorism 
partners in the United States, but considering the apparent lack of consistent monitoring 
or contact with Driver, that worst case scenario appears likely. Aaron Driver was unable 
to travel to support ISIL abroad; in fact, item six on his peace bond agreement clearly 
stated that he was “not to apply for any passport from Canada or any other country.”97 
The peace bond measures clearly never diminished his support for ISIL’s extremist 
worldview; it only narrowed the available directions for him to channel it. Rather than 
being viewed positively as a prevented attack, this violent incident in Canada represents 
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the first documented case of a redirected radical who was subject to a peace bond and still 
committed an act of terrorism, raising serious doubts about the inherent dangers of this 
counterterrorism policy.  
C. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
This chapter began by examining the demonstrated threat to Canada posed by 
ISIL-inspired extremists based in the country and some of the response strategies 
employed by Canadian intelligence and law enforcement authorities to counter it. Over 
the last two years since ISIL began calling for attacks in the West, Canada has suffered at 
least three violent incidents, all carried out by individuals who had previously sought to 
travel overseas but were prevented from doing so. An analysis of these cases revealed 
significant factors for consideration to be observed in ISIL aspiring foreign fighter cases 
including suspicious social media behavior, passport revocation, or other difficulty 
obtaining travel documentation, and catalytic triggers, such as mental illness or family 
issues, or financial adversity. Finally, in response to potential future aspiring foreign 
fighters and redirected radicals, Canada has pursued traditional counterterrorism 
investigations and has employed the tactic of preventative detention through the use of 
peace bonds.  
The judicial practice of peace bonds is relatively recent and the Canadian 
government will undoubtedly face new challenges as it looks to learn more and remedy 
shortfalls brought to light by the Aaron Driver case in particular. It is important that 
reviews focus on the issue of effectively monitoring suspects while subject to peace 
bonds and how best to minimize the serious security risks posed by extremists when the 
terms of these agreements expire.  
As a function of Canada’s peace bonds, those subject to one are officially required 
to surrender their passport to the government, effectively prohibiting the possibility of 
foreign travel. While this action all but guarantees that an ISIL sympathizer will never 
become a foreign fighter overseas, as the cases in this chapter have demonstrated, it 
potentially has the unintended consequence of creating trapped terrorists, dramatically 
increasing the likelihood that aspiring foreign fighters may be more inclined to redirect 
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their targeting and carry out an act of violence on their home soil. Peace bonds have been 
used against numerous terrorism suspects in Canada as barriers, impenetrable walls 
meant to keep an individual from becoming more dangerous through training overseas. 
Without adequate monitoring and follow-up investigation, however, these legal structures 
run the dangerous risk of serving as walls that aspiring foreign fighters can ricochet off of 
to become redirected radicals in their homeland.  
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IV. ISIL’S APPEAL TO AUSTRALIANS  
We have to do more work on community engagement on those who had 
their passports taken. These are troubled young men who are highly 
frustrated and the fact is they can cause a lot of trouble by running 
someone over with a car or attacking them with a knife…if left 
unattended, these people will become ticking time bombs.  
~Professor Greg Barton, Australia’s Monash University 
Global Terrorism Research Center98 
 
A. THE OUTBACK OUT FRONT ON TERRORISM 
The next nation to be analyzed in this comparative study is Australia. Similar to 
the previous chapter, this portion of the thesis provides a background on Australia’s 
experience with modern terrorism and its increasing concern with the threat posed by 
ISIL. Findings from several reports are provided in this chapter to understand the foreign 
fighter dynamic in Australia. A deep dive into the details of two domestic high-profile 
violent incidents and one foreign fighter case will highlight the manifestation of ISIL’s 
threat to the nation. The chapter concludes with a description of several of the 
counterterrorism policies and laws enacted by Australia as part of its effort to combat 
ISIL on the homefront.  
Much like its Commonwealth sister Canada, the former British colony of 
Australia has also weathered the storm of deadly terrorism in a variety of forms over its 
history. Examples of modern terrorism have included attacks with improvised explosive 
devices, small arms, targeted assassinations, firebombing, and other forms of politically 
motivated violence carried out by a range of religious extremists, foreign terrorist 
organizations, single-issue assailants, and neo-Nazi groups, to name a few.  
Australia lost 10 of its citizens in the terrorist attacks of 9/11, more than in any 
prior act on its domestic soil, and Australians have been killed in numerous deadly 
                                                 
98 Ian Lloyd Neubauer, “A Teenage Terrorism Suspect is Shot Dead in Australia after Attacking 
Police,” TIME, September 24, 2014, http://time.com/3423975/isis-australia-melbourne-police-terrorism-
suspect-abdul-numan-haider/. 
 40 
operations elsewhere overseas.99 The most devastating example of this threat was the 
October 2002 bombing carried out by Jemmah Islamiah (JI) in Bali, Indonesia. The 
explosive blasts, which targeted a heavily populated tourist area, left 88 Australians dead 
and remain the deadliest act of terrorism in the country’s history.100  
Between 2003 and 2014, Australia was the target of at least four high-profile 
terrorist plots involving individuals linked to or inspired by al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, and 
other extremist organizations. In the post-9/11 era, Australia has emerged as a critical 
counterterrorism partner and has been an engaged participant in support of U.S.-led 
global counterterrorism efforts, playing a key role in the Global War on Terrorism 
combat theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq. The nation’s history and Southeast Asian 
proximity have helped build it into a trusted, valuable intelligence ally, and a member of 
the “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing network, which includes Canada, New Zealand, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom.101  
This non-isolationist approach to counterterrorism has come at a high cost. With 
this background of consistent targeting, it should come as no surprise that the nation of 
Australia has not gone unnoticed or unscathed with the emergence of ISIL and the 
changing threat environment it has created by inspiring or directing violence against the 
Western world. Rising to meet this challenge, Australia has taken an active role in 
conducting military operations against the terrorist organization, and in October 2014, 
former Prime Minister Tony Abbott authorized Australian air assets to carry out targeted 
strikes against the group in Iraq while deploying Special Forces troops as advisors in the 
country.102  
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B. AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN FIGHTER EXPERIENCE  
In 2014, media reports estimated that roughly 60 Australians were “fighting in the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq,” but the specifics of those figures, namely which terrorist 
groups or anti-Syrian regime rebel factions and other armed entities these individuals 
were a part of, remained a difficult question.103 A later report appeared to expand and 
clarify that figure, arguing that 120 Australians were active in Syria and Iraq either 
fighting or otherwise engaged with terrorist organizations.104 The specific usage of the 
term “terrorist organizations” is likely meant to exclude the outlying category of 
individuals who may have traveled to a conflict zone but without any intention of taking 
part in the conflict; such as volunteers for humanitarian aid groups, freelance journalists, 
refugee charities, etc.  
Additionally, an estimated 100 Australians were believed to be working in 
support roles for extremist groups within Australia and 20 foreign fighters who had 
previously traveled to take part in overseas conflict were thought to have returned to 
Australia.105 Those figures have changed somewhat over the course of the last two years 
and generally are not as well publicized as accounts of Western foreign fighters from 
Europe or the United States. The Soufan Group in late 2015 determined that Australia 
had 120 foreign fighters and claimed the number may unofficially be roughly 255 known 
to the government.106 However, the latest findings, published by New America 
Foundation in March 2016, maintain that Australia has an official foreign fighter count of 
110 and of its total foreign fighter population, 20 are believed to have been killed over 
the course of their fighting overseas.107 While these figures are comparable to those seen 
in Canada and the United States, the number of aspiring foreign fighters and homegrown 
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violent extremists living within the country is doubtless more difficult to quantify; 
however, over the last two years, several high profile cases highlight the consistent 
presence and danger of these individuals.  
1. Numan Haider 
The earlier mentioned ISIL call for attacks by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani was not 
limited to Canada and its people. The threat was aimed at several Western countries 
involved in multinational efforts to combat terrorism, designed as a propaganda call for 
rapid retaliation against Western nations with whatever methods were available to ISIL 
supporters. Australia was no exception. About three days following the propaganda 
release, and roughly one month before the previously discussed terrorist attacks 
transpired on Canadian soil in Ottawa and Quebec, Australia suffered an assault by an 
ISIL-inspired homegrown violent extremist.  
On September 23, 2014, an 18-year-old man named Numan Haider was contacted 
by Australian counterterrorism police officers and instructed to meet with them later in 
the day to discuss concerning reports about his behavior and possible connections to 
extremism.108 In the evening, Haider arrived outside of a police station in the suburb of 
Endeavor Hills in the outskirts of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. He sat on his vehicle, 
which was parked in a dark area near the station and was then approached by the two 
police officers, one from the Victoria Police and the other from the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP).109 After a brief exchange, Haider pulled a knife out and slashed the 
Victoria Police officer across the arm. He then quickly turned to the AFP officer and 
proceeded to stab him in the face, neck, and chest. When the officer was down, he 
continued to stab him causing further wounds to his stomach. The first officer who was 
stabbed was able to recover and opened fire on Haider after he failed to drop his knife. 
Haider was shot in the head and killed. Both officers were seriously injured but survived. 
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His attack followed a significant counterterrorism arrest operation, one of Australia’s 
largest, which disrupted a plot to behead a person in Sydney earlier in September.110 
Although the exact motive for Haider’s attack timing is difficult to determine, it is 
possible that this high-profile arrest may have played a role in accelerating his violent 
action either out of a desire for vengeance or a fear of meeting a similar fate. 
Haider was not unknown to law enforcement authorities, and in the days 
preceding his attack, he took several actions, which undoubtedly raised suspicions and 
alarm.111 Reports state that he made threats to the Australia’s former Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott, posted numerous remarks and content on social media, which made clear 
his support for ISIL, and even went so far as to wave the black and white Shahada flag at 
a local shopping mall prior to his assault.  
The content of his Facebook page was neither subtle nor covert when it came to 
expressing his solidarity with the terrorist organization. Shortly before the attack, he 
changed his profile picture on the platform to a photograph of himself wearing a black ski 
mask, dressed in camouflage, again in front of the Shahada flag. Dressing in this manner 
was likely meant to mimic the appearance of numerous fighters seen in ISIL propaganda 
videos.  
As information was made public in the press following the attack, it became 
apparent that Haider, who sought to leave Australia, at least temporarily, could be 
considered a homegrown violent extremist and an aspiring foreign fighter, who had 
latched on to the ideology of ISIL. A government investigation into his death revealed 
that prior to conducting his attack, he applied for a passport in the hope of traveling 
abroad to Europe and Afghanistan with the goal of finding a spouse. It appears Haider 
was particularly eager to travel, as he opted to apply for an express passport application. 
Following a delay, Haider inquired with a passport office in Australia and was informed 
that his application was placed on hold. On September 21, Haider was officially notified 
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that his passport was cancelled. Officially, the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO) had taken the preventative action in mid-September due to national 
security concerns associated with him. 
Haider was not the only figure of concern within Australia who had potential 
travel plans to link up with ISIL. Media reports from September 2014, during the time 
when the attack took place, estimated that approximately 40 to 60 people had their 
passports cancelled around the same time as Haider as part of an apparent 
counterterrorism initiative preemptively aimed at people who were at risk of joining ISIL 
in Syria and Iraq.112 The fact that less than two days after he became aware of this action, 
Haider became even more overt in his ISIL support actions, almost guaranteeing an 
interaction with law enforcement personnel, raises the question of whether he planned 
and anticipated being summoned by police. Again, as with numerous other cases 
highlighted so far, the knowledge of his inability to travel likely shortened his fuse and 
lowered his threshold for acceptable violence against his home country. When prevented 
from becoming a martyr for ISIL abroad, he chose to die for the cause of the group in his 
own backyard.  
2. Jake Bilardi 
On March 11, 2015, a suicide bombing occurred in Ramadi, Iraq. According to 
reports from the Iraqi military, the bombing was unsuccessful, resulting only in the death 
of the individual driving the vehicle. Some accounts were conflicting, which maintained 
that this one bombing was actually part of a wave of 21 strikes that left 10 people dead 
and 30 injured.113 Occurrences of this sort have unfortunately occurred with tragic 
frequency throughout Iraq and Syria as a consequence of ISIL’s rise throughout the 
region. Regularly, a low-to-no casualty incident, such as this bombing, would not garner 
a significant amount of media coverage or the attention of government officials beyond 
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the immediate area. However, one element of this attack was unusual, an outlier that 
quickly brought it to the forefront of news outlets worldwide. The individual driving the 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was an 18-year-old man from Australia 
named Jake Bilardi.  
Numerous photographs of Bilardi show a young pale-skinned, long-haired boy, an 
ordinary Australian with the important exception of him holding an Avtomat 
Kalashnikova (AK-47) assault rifle in front of the black banners of ISIL while living in 
Iraq.114 Bilardi was born in Australia and went by the name Abu Abdullah al-Australi, a 
nom de guerre that incorporates his home country. The unfortunate end that befell Bilardi 
is not uncommon among Western fighters. A longstanding belief tends to be held that 
when Western foreign fighters who ultimately make the journey and are successful in 
reaching Iraq and Syria arrive, they are quickly trained and are then sent home to carry 
out stabbings, gunfire assaults, bombings, or other complex attacks in their countries. 
Nonetheless, the reality offers a contrary endgame. Often, these foreign fighters have a 
unique skillset that may not be viewed as being anything all that extraordinary in their 
home countries, but is valuable in a conflict zone, such as media production or even 
driving experience. These skillsets on one hand may make their lives more valuable and 
decrease the likelihood that they will be quickly repurposed for attacks without first 
serving ISIL in other ways. A significant number of Western foreign fighters have also 
died in combat with ISIL, either in fighting with warring armed factions or targeted 
coalition airstrikes. 
While much is known about what took place when Bilardi left Australia, it was 
only after his death that details of what could have happened if he had stayed were 
revealed. Bilardi published a lengthy series of writings online, documenting his story and 
                                                 




his path to ISIL from his life in Melbourne, Australia, where he left in 2014.115 In his 
4,400-word manifesto entitled “From Melbourne to Ramadi: My Journey,” Bilardi states:  
Fearing possible attempts by the increasingly intrusive authorities in 
Australia to prevent my departure I began drawing up a Plan B. This plan 
involved launching a string of bombings across Melbourne, targeting 
foreign consulates and political/military targets as well as grenade and 
knife attacks on shopping centers and cafes and culminating with myself 
detonating a belt of explosives amongst the kuffar.116 
Plan B was apparently in effect after Bilardi had an earlier failed attempt to travel 
to link up with ISIL. Australian authorities discovered several improvised explosive 
devices in various stages of assembly at his family’s home in Melbourne.117 Based on a 
review of both Bilardi’s blog, social media accounts, and open-source news coverage, it 
appears that he left Australia in August 2014, likely traveling to Turkey before linking up 
with the group in Syria.118 Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop publicly 
acknowledged that the Australian government was attempting to monitor his movements 
after being notified by his family that he had left the country and traveled to the conflict 
zone.119 In October 2014, the Australian government officially canceled his passport.120 
Bilardi’s case ultimately raises a strong moral policy issue and highlights the 
complexity emerging in many cases of homegrown violent extremists and ISIL’s aspiring 
foreign fighters. Governments have an inherent moral obligation to protect the lives of 
their citizens, even those who become entangled in the web of ISIL’s violent extremist 
worldview that may potentially pose a threat to others. For this reason, governments 
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increasingly invest significant resources in all manner of countering violent extremism 
and dereadicalization programs for those susceptible to ISIL’s poisonous ideology. 
Individuals liking ISIL on Facebook, and stating how much they want to die as a martyr 
in Syria, does not give intelligence and law enforcement authorities a pass at taking every 
possible action to prevent that fate. If individuals are on the low end of the radicalization 
spectrum, it may be tempting to adopt a laissez-faire mindset about foreign travel, 
believing that authorities can wash their hands of responsibility once an extremist exits 
their borders and enters a conflict zone where they are likely to be killed. At the same 
time, this approach is pernicious because governments that willingly permit their citizens 
to support a terrorist organization by traveling abroad are, through inaction, knowingly 
aiding these extremist groups and allowing would be bombers to blow up overseas rather 
than at home. Facilitating the movement of foreign recruits to an ISIL conflict zone by 
not taking preventative law enforcement action through arrests or other measures could 
be considered tantamount to providing material support for terrorism, an act outlawed in 
virtually all Western nations.  
Bilardi’s case highlights the complexity and difficulty of this foreign fighter 
problem. He hoped to travel overseas and fight for ISIL. He hoped to die in combat for 
the group if the opportunity presented itself and went so far as to volunteer to become a 
suicide bomber. The Australian government remained committed to preventing his ability 
to travel to a foreign conflict zone by revoking his passport, but failed to do so before he 
was able to reach his destination successfully with the terrorist group. Paradoxically, 
given what is now known about Bilardi’s “Plan B,” the Australian government’s inability 
to cancel his passport two months earlier appears to actually be the single greatest factor 
that prevented a deadly attack from taking place on the country’s soil.  
3. Man Haron Monis 
So far, all the cases of homegrown violent extremist attacks in Australia by ISIL-
inspired individuals have involved low-tech tactics, assaults with small arms, and edged 
weapons that require little-to-no tactical training to reap deadly results. However, the 
Australian experience is not limited to these incidents, and in one case, the attention of 
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the world was centered on a prolonged high-profile attack that appeared to show greater 
pre-meditation and had the potential for mass casualties.  
During the morning of December 15, 2014, Man Haron Monis entered a Lindt 
Chocolate Café located in Sydney’s central business district. Armed with a shotgun, the 
gunman held at least 18 people hostage. The hostage siege, coming on the heels of a 
string of domestic attacks in the West, was initially speculated in media reporting to be a 
terrorist attack, and shortly after it began, these early rumors were confirmed when a 
hostage was photographed while being forced to hold the black and white standard flag 
bearing the Islamic Shahada. 
For nearly 17 hours, Monis held his hostages captive with the threat of executing 
those who tried to escape.121 The attack demonstrated elements of prolonged theatricality 
and spectacle designed to maximize media attention in contrast to the trend of the smaller 
scale previous attacks. Monis’ actions were meant to show his adherence to the ideology 
of and affiliation with ISIL. At no point was this act clearer than when he made one of his 
demands, for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to publish reports that the 
nation was “under attack by the Islamic State.”122 This action was one of several 
demands made by Monis who also told authorities that he wanted to speak to Australian 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott and demanded that officials cut the power to Christmas 
lights in Martin Place, a popular commercial district where the attack occurred.123, 
Ultimately, following hours of unsuccessful negotiations with Monis, 
counterterrorism authorities decided to storm the café with the New South Wales Police 
Force’s tactical operations unit at approximately 2:13 a.m. on December 16, after the 
gunman executed a kneeling female hostage, shooting her in the back of the head at 
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point-blank range.124 An additional civilian lost her life in the crossfire from officers who 
shot and killed the hostage taker.125  
As with several of the cases discussed so far, Monis could be considered what 
counterterrorism analyst Patrick Poole and staff analysts from private-sector intelligence 
firms have referred to as a “known wolf,” an individual who had long been on the radar 
of Australian and American authorities for his well-publicized extremist beliefs and 
actions.126 To say that Monis was a known element to authorities would be a major 
understatement. The Iranian-born Shi’ite Muslim, who had only recently converted to 
Sunni Islam and adopted a worldview supportive of ISIL, had numerous encounters with 
law enforcement dating back to 2009 where he overtly showed indicators of his growing 
extremism. Perhaps, the most notable and high-profile of these incidents came when he 
was found guilty of using postal services in a criminal manner to harass the families of 
Australian soldiers killed in Afghanistan.127 Additionally, the 50-year-old Monis was 
charged with accessory to murder in the death of his former wife and faced charges for 
over 40 counts of sexual assault and other crimes.128  
His extremist indicators do not appear to have slowed or ceased in the time 
immediately preceding his attack, and the Australian government confirmed after the 
hostage siege that at least one person had called the nation’s counterterrorism hotline 
anonymously to file a suspicious activity report about Monis for pro-ISIL content posted 
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on his personal website.129 This content included a pledge to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
leader and self-proclaimed Caliph of ISIL.130 None of his earlier violent behaviors or 
recent extremist postings, however, was deemed sufficient enough for Australian 
intelligence and law enforcement authorities to believe he posed a potential national 
security threat and he reportedly did not rate as a high priority within the top 400 known 
or suspected violent extremists considered potential risks during the time of his attack.131  
Another familiar element has appeared in the case of Man Haron Monis, 
limitations on his travel. Although the reason was linked to his numerous pending sexual 
assault charges rather than terrorism-related crimes, Monis was ordered to surrender his 
passport as part of the conditions of a bail agreement, for a time effectively preventing 
him from any foreign travel.132 However, conflicting reports state that his passport was 
returned back to him in the months prior to his assault.133 It is unclear if Monis harbored 
a desire to travel abroad to link up with ISIL, the group that he sought desperately to 
associate himself with in his final days, but the fact that he was aware of being known to 
authorities may have played a major contributing role in his decision to direct violence 
against his homeland.  
In the public discourse over the actions of the Sydney hostage-taker, attempts 
have been made to classify him as a largely incompetent individual whose actions were 
more the result of mental illness rather than ideological commitment to ISIL. One hostage 
who escaped from the siege later even went on to describe him as a “dangerous 
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toddler.”134 Others have described him differently. Notably, forensic psychiatrist Dr. 
Jonathan Phillips maintained in an official government inquiry exploring the attack that 
Monis was an intelligent man and a dangerous psychopath with a range of personality 
disorders including paranoia and narcissism who would have continued killing hostages 
if he was not shot by police.135  
Regardless of his potential medical preconditions, his case highlights the danger 
of emotionally disturbed persons when their adherence to the ideology of extremist 
groups that routinely espouse violence becomes clear. It is possible that intelligence and 
law enforcement authorities’ perception of Monis as just another unremarkable crazy 
person rather than an individual with a demonstrated proclivity for violent behavior led to 
a hesitation to take any action aimed at detaining him. The known ISIL sympathizer’s 
freedom of movement and ability to avoid drawing heavier suspicion ultimately proved 
deadly.  
C. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE 
Similar to the experience of Canada, the uptick in ISIL-inspired attacks and plots 
in Australia, coupled with the outflow of foreign fighters from the country to jihadist 
fields of conflict abroad, prompted the government of former Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott in 2014 to propose a series of legal measures that resulted in enhanced arrest and 
surveillance authorities for security agencies in the country.136 Although the Australian 
government continues to explore and implement a strategic whole of government 
counterterrorism response to ISIL in the area of countering violent extremism, it is clear 
that it has devoted a disproportionately larger amount of resources to more traditional 
approaches. For example, in 2014, the government of Australia authorized $630 million 
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dollars in expanded funding to the nation’s intelligence and law enforcement entities 
tasked with its counterterrorism mission.137  
Financing from this general pool of counterterrorism funds was marked for 
developing new programs or expanding upon existing national security efforts aimed at 
reducing ISIL-related threats to the Australian homeland. One of the more unique 
measures slated for increased funding was the recently established Border Force Counter-
Terrorism Unit (CTU).138 Border Force CTUs were set up as a joint interagency 
counterterrorism model aimed at first deploying officers at Sydney and Melbourne 
international airports to deter aspiring foreign fighters.139 While at these airports, these 
teams perform investigative interdictions and screenings, which are designed to prevent 
would-be extremists from joining ISIL overseas. Presumably, the deployment of Border 
Force CTUs are meant as a final deterrent to send a message to those hoping to travel 
abroad that should they attempt to exit the country by air, they will be stopped and 
arrested. While arrests of suspected ISIL supporters have been made since the overt 
program’s implementation, the sheer number of stops and inquiries in the nation’s 
airports has also drawn significant criticism and concerns over its potential for racial, 
ethnic, and religious profiling.140 
Much like the Canadian Bill C-51 discussed in Chapter III, in late 2014, Australia 
approved its own expanded security legislation known as the Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment Foreign Fighters Bill with numerous legal provisions outlawing 
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support for ISIL.141 The bill also introduced specific crimes for visiting “declared areas” 
of territory, where factions affiliated with the group are active, on a list authorized by the 
government without sufficient pre-approved justification.142  
Comparatively, with the previously discussed legal tool of peace bonds used by 
the Canadian government in counterterrorism matters, Australia has been less willing to 
use similar preemptive enforcement tools. However, although their implementation is 
rare, it does have these legal resources at its disposal. In Australia, control orders and 
preventative detention orders (PDO) are designed to accomplish the same end as peace 
bonds, allowing for lawful limitations on an individual’s freedom of movement based on 
suspicion of a terrorist act rather than court determined evidence of a criminal offense. As 
of January 2015, control orders have been used on four occasions and PDOs have been 
employed in three cases.143 
Despite their limited use, one recent homegrown violent extremist attack raised 
the issue of the limitations of Australia’s peace-bond-esque detention orders. Until 
recently, significant age restrictions governed the use of these orders against young 
people, even in traditional terrorism-related cases. On October 2, 2015, a 15-year-old boy 
named Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar made his way to the headquarters of the New 
South Wales Police Force, located in Parramatta, Australia, a suburb of Sydney.144 Jabar 
was armed with a .38 caliber revolver and arrived at the police facility at 4:30 p.m.145 
Around this time, at the end of the workday, a civilian police accountant named Curtis 
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Cheng exited the building and was ambushed by Jabar who shot and killed him. Three 
police officers responded to the gunfire and were able to shoot and kill Jabar.146 The 
attack, which was likely aimed at killing a police officer, and linked to a larger group of 
ISIL-inspired individuals, was ultimately praised by the terrorist organization.147 In the 
aftermath, and as a direct response to that single attack, the government of Australia 
under its current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, authorized an expansion of the use of 
control orders. These tools, which once covered children as young as 16, are now legal to 
be implemented in cases of suspected terrorists as young as 14.148  
Although some measures like the changes to control orders and PDOs highlight 
the Australian government’s awareness of the risk of domestic extremists in the 
homeland, overwhelmingly, the current counterterrorism enforcement model in Australia 
is geared towards identifying suspected extremists as early as possible and preventing 
them from traveling to connect with ISIL or other groups overseas. Australia is heavily 
focused on the foreign fighter threat, in the belief and fearful certainty that individuals 
will “return to Australia with enhanced terrorism capabilities and ideological 
commitment,” and therefore, be more dangerous than individuals contained on its 
domestic soil.149  
Evidence for this approach, and the prioritization of the returnee threat by the 
Australian government, is best seen in the country’s practice of regularly cancelling 
passports, not only for identified homegrown violent extremists, but also in some cases, 
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the associates of known Australian foreign fighters.150 Passport cancellations have 
increased dramatically since the emergence of ISIL and well-publicized reports of 
Australian citizens based in Iraq and Syria calling for attacks in their home country on 
behalf of the terrorist organization. In 2014, ISIL’s first official year of operation when it 
declared its so-called “caliphate,” the Australian Security Intelligence Organization 
(ASIO) canceled at least 45 of its citizens’ passports.151 During the previous year, that 
severe course of action was only pursued on 18 occasions.152 The most recent reporting 
on this subject from February 2015 indicates that the passports of at least 105 Australians 
have been cancelled, suspended, or otherwise prevented from being issued in response to 
terrorism-related concerns.153  
D. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
Based on these cases, it is apparent that Australia has suffered at least two 
terrorist attacks carried out by redirected radicals over the course of the last two years. 
Again, similar to the Canadian experience, these attacks involved individuals known to 
law enforcement and intelligence authorities. Despite extremist postings on social media 
and public reports of suspicious activity, these individuals did not meet the threshold 
necessary for prolonged surveillance and further investigation raising serious analytical 
questions about the process by which ISIL cases are prioritized in Australia. On the 
surface, the limited number of violent incidents in Australia may serve as validation for 
the country’s counterterrorism policies and their central focus on preventing domestic 
extremists from becoming foreign fighters. The fact that Australia has in the last two 
years canceled well over 100 passports for its citizens suspected of being involved in 
terrorism demonstrates how severe this threat is perceived. Unfortunately, this practice, 
which does not necessarily mean that those who have their passports canceled 
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automatically receive 24-hour surveillance, also poses a great long-term danger for the 
country. Without criminal prosecution, lawful detention, or continuous monitoring, every 
one of those suspects whose passports were canceled out of fear of them joining ISIL 
abroad, may now feel trapped, and be even more likely to redirect, supporting ISIL by 
carrying out an attack at home. 
From a brutal assault on law enforcements officers, and a hostage siege in one of 
the nation’s most popular tourism areas, to the assassination of a police employee, 
Australia has been faced with ISIL-inspired homegrown violent extremism. Although 
none of these incidents was carried out by an individual with training alongside the 
terrorist group in Iraq, Syria, or on any other overseas conflict zones, the foreign fighter 
issue has clearly become a key strategic concern for the Australian government and the 
focal point of the nation’s counterterrorism policy. Some legal provisions in Australian 
counterterrorism law allow for a greater degree of covert action and remove the need to 
inform suspected terrorists of mobility-limiting actions taken against them, an 
improvement over the Canadian model. Nevertheless, the risk remains that homegrown 
violent extremists in Australia—particularly those, who for reasons of youth or mental 
illness, do not draw the highest prioritization of law enforcement and intelligence 
authorities—will be more likely to pursue a domestic attack trajectory rather than 
exclusively support terrorism overseas.  
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V. ISIL’S AMERICAN ADHERENTS  
ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle 
East—including American citizens, personnel, and facilities. If left 
unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, 
including to the United States. While we have not yet detected specific 
plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and 
our allies. Our intelligence community believes that thousands of 
foreigners—including Europeans and some Americans—have joined them 
in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters could try to 
return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks.  
~President Barack Obama154 
 
President Obama’s early assessment of the ISIL threat facing the homeland 
centered on the danger of returned foreign fighters. However, for the United States, this 
specific foreign fighter threat, which has proven lethal in parts of Western Europe, has 
not manifested itself in the homeland over the ISIL caliphate’s two-year lifespan. 
Numerous factors may account for that lack of materialization; for example, the sheer 
number of American citizens known to be abroad in Iraq and Syria pales in comparison 
to the figures of some key U.S. allies in Europe, including France and the United 
Kingdom. Europe’s proximity to the primary conflict zones of Iraq and Syria, and the far 
simpler transportation logistics of sending trained fighters home throughout Western 
European countries, has also likely played a major part as a driver of the heightened 
returnee threat across the continent. 
Despite the lack of incidents in the United States involving foreign fighter 
returnees, the potential threat of this scenario remains. For counterterrorism authorities 
and policymakers, it is important to understand that ISIL’s current inability to dispatch 
foreign fighters back to the U.S. homeland has not limited the reach of the terrorist group 
to inspire and enable violent attacks in America and elsewhere by pursuing other 
strategies. The United States was once tempted to believe that vast oceans on either side 
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of the mainland could provide security and avoid the looming specter of war; today, the 
same flawed thinking cannot be applied to ISIL, given its proven ability to motivate 
domestically-based extremists to carry out violence within America.  
As the last of the three comparative national cases, this chapter focuses on the 
American experience with the ISIL threat to date. Several high-profile violent incidents 
and attacks, including reactionary violence by extremists potentially triggered by law 
enforcement actions, are examined for strategic and operational takeaways. Additionally, 
given the significant number of counterterrorism cases within the United States, and the 
abundance of publicly available, courtroom information, numerous disrupted plots 
involving individuals, which can now be accurately classified as redirected radicals, are 
explored in detail. Finally, this chapter focuses on key aspects of the American law 
enforcement and intelligence response to ISIL over the last two years, using metrics from 
incidents and arrests to come to a clearer understanding of the strengths and potential 
drawbacks of the current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the homeland.  
A. VIOLENT INCIDENTS  
FBI Director Comey has often discussed the danger of ISIL’s current influential 
reach into the United States and its proven ability to radicalize young men and women to 
violence in support of its cause. He stated:  
ISIL in particular is putting out a siren song through their slick 
propaganda, through social media, that goes like this: Troubled soul, come 
to the Caliphate; you will live a life of glory; these are the apocalyptic end 
times; you will find a life of meaning here fighting for our so-called 
Caliphate. And if you can’t come, kill somebody where you are.155  
The cases and Western ISIL-related traveler metrics explored in Chapters III and 
IV demonstrate that the number of suspected attempted and successful foreign fighters 
between the United States, Canada, and Australia are similar. However, America has 
suffered a comparably higher amount of violent incidents involving homegrown violent 
extremists over the course of the two years since ISIL opened its doors and entered the 
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business of global terror. A comprehensive review of current data has determined that at 
least 11 violent incidents involving either successful attacks against both civilian and 
non-civilian targets, or attempts on the lives of law enforcement personnel have occurred 
across eight states since the formation of ISIL’s so-called Caliphate. All these attacks 
appear to have a clear nexus to violent jihadists, and all but one was carried out by ISIL-
inspired extremists. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Suspected HVE Attacks in the United States over ISIL’s Lifetime156 
The first attack by a specifically ISIL-inspired HVE in the United States occurred 
on October 23, 2014, when 32-year old Zale Thompson attacked a group of four New 
York City Police Department (NYPD) officers with a hatchet, leaving two injured, and 
one with a severe head wound.157 The attacker was shot and killed by officers at the 
scene.158 The most recent ISIL-inspired attack occurred on June 12, 2016, when a lone 
gunman named Omar Mir Siddique Mateen, opened fire with an assault rifle at the 
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popular gay Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, leaving at least 49 dead and 53 
injured.159 It was the single deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history and the most lethal 
act of terrorism on American soil since 9/11.160 It is important to highlight that the 
casualty count in that one attack was greater than the total of all prior post-9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States.161 Both of these attacks came shortly after the release of 
separate propaganda videos by ISIL’s Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, which called for 
operations by supporters in their home countries. Despite their rivalry, both ISIL and al-
Qa’ida have continually praised the assailants as models for aspiring ISIL extremists to 
follow.  
Recognizing the increased operational tempo of attacks of this sort by domestic 
extremists, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, described ISIL as the 
“preeminent global threat” earlier this year.162 In additional briefings, he went on to add 
that “homegrown violent extremists…will probably continue to pose the most significant 
Sunni terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland in 2016.”163 He provided metrics to support 
this assessment, highlighting that approximately 60 HVEs with links to ISIL had been 
arrested in the United States in 2015.164  
1. Garland, Texas, Attack 
No law enforcement agency ever wants to see the security response plans drawn 
up for a potential terrorist attack put into action in a real world situation. After all, an 
officer having to shoot and kill a suspect to prevent an attack is the worst-case scenario. 
While it ultimately ends up being the last line of defense, such incidents often highlight 
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that a previous opportunity to prevent an attack may have been missed. On May 3, 2015, 
that last line was put to the test when two heavily armed men wearing ballistics vests 
exited their vehicle at the Curtis Culwell convention center located in Garland, Texas, in 
what appears to be the first ISIL-related act of terrorism involving redirected radicals in 
the United States.165 The two attackers sought to shoot their way into the building, which 
was hosting a controversial drawing contest featuring satirical images of the Prophet 
Muhammad.166 Both of the American-born attackers, identified as Nadir Soofi and Elton 
Simpson, were shot and killed, and were unable to breach the security perimeter 
established during the event.167 The attackers were the only fatalities in the operation, 
which left one security officer wounded.168 While the attack was objectively a failure, 
with the assailants not reaching their intended target, or causing the mass-casualties they 
had hoped for, it was nevertheless claimed on behalf of ISIL and the group later praised 
the operation. Even a failed attack is a form of force projection that helps bolster the 
perception that ISIL is succeeding and readily able to conduct attacks in the United 
States.  
The Garland, Texas attack demonstrated another element of ISIL’s strategy in the 
West, using foreign fighters not exclusively for attacks upon return in their homeland, but 
instead as communications conduits. These Western foreign fighters, by virtue of posting 
online via social media, possess a certain battlefield bonafides that allows them to 
command a captive audience among eager aspiring foreign fighters in their home 
countries; a pool of potential redirected radicals.  
Following the failed assault, it was revealed that Elton Simpson had an extensive 
social media footprint indicating his support for ISIL across Twitter.169 He was in direct 
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contact online with two well-known foreign fighters, a British national named Abu 
Hussain al-Britani, a.k.a. Junaid Hussain, and Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan, a.k.a. 
Mujahid Miski, a Somali-American who previously joined al-Shabaab but shifted his 
worldview and allegiance closer in line with ISIL.170 The extent of the connections 
remains somewhat unclear, but it appears likely that these foreign fighters may have 
helped enable the Garland operation either by providing targeting guidance, 
encouragement, or other forms of support for the U.S.-based attackers from overseas 
conflict zones. The communication went beyond openly visible social media platforms. 
After more than seven months of investigation following the attack, FBI Director Comey 
publicly announced that one of the attackers exchanged 109 encrypted messages with a 
known, but unnamed, overseas terrorist during the morning prior to the operation in 
Garland.171  
When examining the background of the perpetrators behind this attack, it is 
important to highlight some of the apparent parallels between these individuals and other 
HVEs responsible for attacks in Canada and Australia. Simpson, according to several 
reports, had been the subject of a counterterrorism investigation by the FBI since 2007 
and was arrested in 2010 for a previous attempt to travel abroad to join al-Shabaab, the 
Somalia-based official affiliate of al-Qa’ida in East Africa, not ISIL.172 This reporting 
shows that while his extremist views and affiliations evolved over time, he had 
previously sought to engage in jihad overseas prior to committing to an attack at home. 
Simpson ultimately was not sentenced to extensive jail time on terrorism charges and 
instead was given probation and a minimal fine in 2011 for making false statements to 
authorities.173 Despite the lack of a terrorism conviction, Simpson reportedly believed 
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that he was on a U.S. government “no-fly-list” as early as 2010, all but assuring that he 
would be unable to leave the country in the future.174  
As the investigation into the incident in Garland continued, a third individual in 
Arizona, identified as Decarus Lowell, a.k.a. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem, was convicted 
of being a co-conspirator in the Garland attack, responsible for encouraging the two 
gunmen and equipping them with firearms.175 In yet another example of an extremist 
being more than simply an unremarkable person, he was also previously known to 
authorities and had been interviewed during a terrorism investigation in 2011.176 During 
that investigation, various terrorism propaganda materials, specifically al-Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP’s) English-language magazine Inspire, were found on his 
computer.177  
Beyond the government investigation, the Garland attack drew considerable 
attention in the media and private security sector. The use of multiple attackers and the 
social media connections to ISIL foreign fighters made it the second ISIL-related act of 
violence in the United States and a high-profile event that triggered a debate on the 
terrorist group’s ability to launch future American attacks. For example, the private-
sector intelligence firm Stratfor maintained shortly after the attack that ISIL’s decision to 
claim responsibility for the operation was a sign of desperation, demonstrating how 
limited its capabilities were. Specifically, the Stratfor report claimed: 
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The reliance on grassroots jihadists to conduct attacks means that the 
Islamic State lacks the capability to control, train and assist such 
operatives. As a result, many grassroots attacks are amateurish.178  
However, it is important to note that the “amateurish” nature of these two 
attackers is likely not what led to the attack being a failure. Rather, were it not for the 
preventative security resources at that location, which were in place specifically because 
of perceived threats to the controversial event, it is very likely that the United States 
could have suffered a mass-casualty attack with a fatality count similar to what was 
witnessed months later in San Bernardino, California, or more recently in Orlando, 
Florida.  
B. THE AMERICAN REDIRECTED 
An extensive review of public court data and open source media coverage on 
terrorism-related charges filed by the FBI, between the formation of ISIL and February 
2016, determined that out of 56 identified ISIL extremists who wanted to travel overseas 
to link up with the terrorist organizations or provide material support to facilitate the 
travel of another supporter, at least seven also expressed an interest in carrying out an 
attack on U.S. soil. Several of these individuals listed as follows in high-profile domestic 
cases represent the presence of redirected extremists in America and a population, which 
if overtly led to believe that no limitations were placed against their freedom of 
movement, may have ultimately focused their violent actions outside U.S. territorial 
borders rather than internally.  
1. Hasan and Jonas Edmonds  
In March 2015, authorities with the Chicago JTTF arrested 22-year-old U.S. 
citizen Hasan Edmonds at Midway International Airport while attempting to board an 
Egypt-bound flight, which he planned to take on his journey to join ISIL.179 On the same 
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day, his cousin Jonas Edmonds was also taken into custody on material support for 
terrorism charges.180 Hasan Edmonds, in conversations with an undercover asset, 
discussed that his cousin had a prior criminal record and had served time in prison 
making it unlikely for him to travel without being stopped. He stated “they try hard to 
keep people like him trapped in America.”181 Despite this obstacle, he made it clear that 
if his cousin were unable to join the group, he would carry out an attack to obtain 
martyrdom in the heart of the United States, which he referred to as the “kuffar state.”182 
According to court documents, at one point during a conversation with an 
undercover asset, Jonas Edmonds discussed the limitations on his ability to travel 
overseas. He had hoped to travel to Mosul, the de facto capital of ISIL’s territory in Iraq. 
He stated “Although I am currently working on it. I am unable to get my passport. If I 
find myself stuck here. I intend to take advantage of being so close to the kuffar.”183 
He outlined a very clear preference for foreign operations, but also a willingness 
to redirect his targeting toward his homeland if he was unable to travel overseas, saying:  
The plans are made from two points. One consists of doing all I can to be 
able to make hijrah with my family. I already let you know that I would 
need for that. Two, if I can’t make hijrah then Insha’Allah. I can unleash 
the lion. What I would need…honestly nothing. I am prepared to go even 
if it’s with a rock. But a small team, no more than five, hardware and 
maybe a firecracker. I do have access to hardware.184 
As the investigation moved further along, Jonas Edmonds appeared to finally 
accept the fact that he would be unable to travel overseas and offered to an undercover 
asset his plan to purchase weapons including an AK-47 assault rifle and grenades for an 
attack on a military installation in the United States, with the hope of causing 100 to 150 
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casualties.185 While this case successfully concluded with two arrests and no lives being 
endangered, had the two individuals both been led to believe that their travel abroad 
would in no way be limited, it may have removed entirely the option of targeting their 
homeland in the near-term altogether.  
The key analytical takeaway from this case and several others is the element of 
risk that consistently accompanies investigations of individuals committed to joining ISIL 
in conflict zones overseas. Clandestine counterterrorism efforts, such as watchlisting, are 
an effective tool at preventing travel for terrorism suspects and preventing the long-term, 
less likely scenario of creating foreign fighter returnees. However, law enforcement and 
intelligence authorities involved in undercover counterterrorism investigations have a 
unique opportunity to recognize and mitigate the urgent risk of domestic attack 
redirection by leading suspects to believe that they are still able to move about the globe 
freely.  
2. Akhror Saidakhmetov 
Akhror Saidakhmetov, a Kazakhstan-born permanent resident of the United States 
who lived in Brooklyn, New York, has been described as a “would-be foreign fighter.”186 
In February 2015, counterterrorism authorities arrested him as part of a group of men 
who sought to conspire and provide material support to ISIL. According to court 
documents originally filed under seal but later made public, Saidakhmetov claimed that 
he sought to travel to join ISIL as early as September 2014 and made efforts to do so, 
with the intention of traveling to Russia, Turkey, and then to Syria in an effort to limit the 
suspicion accompanying a flight directly to a conflict zone.187 However, he encountered 
a number of limitations, specifically the cost of air transportation and gaining access to 
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his passport, which his mother took from him out of fear that he planned on joining 
jihadists overseas.188  
As time moved forward, Saidakhmetov appears to have grown frustrated with 
being prevented from foreign travel. During that time, he discussed with another suspect 
his interest in joining the U.S. military to serve as an informant for ISIL and potentially 
carry out an attack against armed forces personnel. When he continued to have difficulty 
in obtaining his passport, Saidakhmetov was recorded telling a confidential informant 
that he planned to purchase an AK-47 assault rifle and “shoot all police” if he was unable 
to travel to Syria.189 
The co-accused other suspect mentioned earlier in this case, identified as 
Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev, also appeared to shift his targeting interests based on 
his travel limitations. Juraboev had been investigated by the FBI and questioned after 
posting numerous hostile statements including one that described his desire to assassinate 
President Obama. No formal charges were brought against Juraboev, but the meeting 
likely led him to believe that he was under law enforcement scrutiny. Excerpts from 
conversations by Juraboev in court documents exemplify this belief including, “If right 
now I decide to go anywhere, except for Uzbekistan (his home country), they may arrest 
me.”190  
At one point shortly before his arrest, Saidakhmetov was recorded in a 
conversation describing that if he were able to get to an airport to travel to Syria, and was 
detected and prevented by law enforcement, that he would kill a police officer at the 
facility, steal a firearm, and shoot other responding law enforcement personnel, with the 
aim of dying in the process.191 The commitment to violent action in the United States is a 
significant element that is vital to be considered in HVE cases, especially where an 
individual has expressed an interest in traveling abroad to fight with a terrorist group. In 
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several cases, other ISIL-inspired extremists have taken violent actions against law 
enforcement when contact was made with investigators; a final act of lashing out when it 
appeared that their intended plan would be disrupted.  
3. Usaamah Rahim 
On June 2, 2015, a 26-year-old ISIL supporter, Usaamah Rahim, was under 24-
hour surveillance by counterterrorism authorities near Boston, Massachusetts.192 
Recognizing that he was being watched, Rahim, armed with a military knife, lunged at a 
Boston police officer and an FBI agent before being shot and killed by JTTF 
authorities.193 Rahim was part of a group of two other men who plotted to behead Pamela 
Geller, a controversial anti-Islam blogger and organizer, who founded the organization 
that hosted the previously mentioned Prophet Muhammad Drawing Contest in Garland, 
Texas.194 Subsequent court reporting revealed that Rahim was previously in contact with 
Junaid Hussain, a Western ISIL foreign fighter described earlier as being in contact with 
one of the Garland, Texas attackers, and communicated with him prior to the failed 
operation.195  
Rahim also was likely involved in preparing a “demonstration killing,” a low-tech 
terrorist tactic intended to result in the murder of a law enforcement officer and a favored 
high-impact method of attack for ISIL. Rahim’s case highlights why HVEs who have 
confirmed contact with Western fighters likely pose a greater threat to counterterrorism 
investigators. During conversations with Hussain, Rahim was reportedly instructed to 
carry a knife in the event that federal agents attempted to take him into custody.196  
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Posing an ever-greater challenge, the budding abundance of encrypted 
communication techniques and applications continues to make this element of terrorist 
connectivity difficult for authorities to determine. For Western foreign fighters in 
overseas conflict zones, known direct contact with extremists in the United States appears 
to be a surefire way of increasing the likelihood of drawing not only the attention of 
domestic counterterrorism authorities but foreign deployed military assets as well. Junaid 
Hussain was killed in a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike in Syria two months 
after Rahim’s plot was disrupted.197  
4. Munther Omar Saleh 
On June 13, 2015, a college student in Queens, New York, identified as 20-year-
old Munther Omar Saleh, was arrested.198 Saleh had been the subject of an undercover 
counterterrorism investigation and was believed to be preparing an act of terrorism 
targeting landmarks in New York City using a pressure cooker improvised explosive 
device.199 While traveling in a vehicle near the Whitestone Bridge, Saleh reportedly 
realized that he was under surveillance by undercover law enforcement investigators. He 
likely had been aware that he had drawn the attention and scrutiny of authorities as early 
as March 2015, when he was interviewed by JTTF investigators for prior suspicious 
activity. According to court documents, Saleh engaged in “anti-surveillance” maneuvers 
including driving with the lights off, erratic vehicular behaviors, and sudden braking and 
acceleration, in an effort to lose pursuing authorities.200  
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He and a co-conspirator, Imran Rabbani, eventually exited their vehicle and 
charged at the investigators before being taken into custody.201 Saleh was armed with a 
tactical folding knife at the time, indicating a similar preparedness to take violent action 
against law enforcement if prevented from completing his mission.202 Saleh and Rabbani 
were connected to at least four other men who similarly planned to join ISIL, one of 
whom was able to travel to Jordan before being arrested by authorities there.203 This case 
highlights that networks of support among domestic extremist can be important and 
telling indicators of intent and ability to carry out future violence. For example, according 
to court records, Saleh praised the failed Garland, Texas, attack on Twitter and likely 
sought to achieve the similar status and praise that those killed extremists received.204 
5. Fareed Mumuni 
One of the individuals who was part of Saleh’s network was 21-year-old Fareed 
Mumuni. According to a criminal complaint, after Saleh was arrested, he provided 
information to authorities that Mumuni planned to travel overseas to join ISIL and also 
expressed an interest in attacking the law enforcement personnel that he was aware were 
monitoring him.205 Mumuni matches the profile of a redirected radical, and at one point, 
shortly before his arrest, he stated to Saleh “I decided to tell my parents I will be gone in 
much less than a year, in sha Allah, you have two choices, either you let me go to Darul 
Islam or you watch me kill non-Muslims here.”206 
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On June 17, 2015, members of the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
executed a search warrant at the Staten Island home of this individual.207 While an FBI 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team performed their duties, Mumuni approached 
one of the operators with a large kitchen knife concealed on his person and attempted to 
drive the blade into the investigator.208 Fortunately, the suspect’s blade was not able to 
penetrate the operator’s ballistic vest, and prevented serious injury and saved the agent’s 
life. A subsequent search of a vehicle used by Mumuni led to the discovery of a second 
knife, leading to the likelihood that he also may have been prepared to target officers if 
stopped while driving.  
After his arrest, Mumuni repeated a similar script that becomes increasingly 
apparent in violent incidents involving domestic HVEs. He claimed that he intended to 
travel to ISIL-controlled areas abroad to join the terrorist organization, and in the event 
that his efforts to do so were disrupted, he had planned and prepared to attack law 
enforcement personnel.209  
C. AMERICA’S RESPONSE 
As these previous cases all highlight, there has been no shortage of ISIL 
extremists in the United States who first looked outward with violent intent before 
redirecting within their homeland’s borders. Proactive undercover investigations have 
been used on numerous occasions as part of the nation’s response strategy to ISIL’s 
domestic threat. Of the over 100 U.S. residents accused of supporting ISIL over the last 
two years, effective investigations of extremists have prevented many suspects from 
carrying out attacks on American soil.210  
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Recent reporting indicates that on the federal level, the use of undercover 
counterterrorism investigations (commonly referred to as “stings”) in ISIL-related cases 
in the United States has experienced an upward trend.211 According to findings from the  
New York Times, this approach has been used in two out of three ISIL cases on U.S. soil, 
demonstrating an institutional preference by the FBI for traditional early interdiction law 
enforcement investigations that result in arrest and sentencing rather than preventative 
measures that limit travel without formal charges like what has been used in Australia or 
the peace bond alternative found in Canada.212  
Evaluating the success of this response strategy is important to understand its 
effectiveness in mitigating the risk of redirected radicals and identify possible areas of 
improvement. A large amount of statistical data is available regarding current terrorism-
related cases, which have resulted in arrests within the United States since the formation 
of ISIL and its declaration of a state. These metrics offer some insight into the approach 
of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities in response to this threat. In 
the opening preface of a statistical study authored by the Fordham University Law School 
Center on Law and Security, researchers described the U.S. law enforcement approach as 
driven by two key goals. The first was to prevent individuals within the United States 
from joining ISIL’s ranks overseas. The second was to prevent individuals from 
mounting attacks in the American homeland. 
As of July 2016, at least 101 cases involving ISIL-related extremists and a total of 
94 indictments were in U.S. federal courts.213 The strategy of federal law enforcement 
has relied heavily on the material support for terrorism charge, based on the figure that 
80% of those indicted faced accusations of that crime.214 From a prosecutorial standpoint 
of the 94 persons charged in federal court, 46 were convicted, with many of the cases 
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awaiting trial.215 Overwhelmingly, the evidence collected in these investigations has been 
compelling enough to result in guilty pleas in roughly 85% (46) of the cases, with 7% (7) 
being convicted in trials.216  
Furthermore, 14 ISIL-related extremists have been sentenced for their crimes, 
receiving an average of 9.2 years in prison.217 Worth noting is that, at this time, not a 
single ISIL-related suspected charged with terrorism-related crimes has been acquitted. 
The prosecutions in these cases currently have a 100% success rate.218  
From a tactical standpoint, the preferred operation by federal authorities appears 
to be investigations that bring a suspect to the furthest point possible for an aspiring 
foreign fighter without endangering public safety. Evidence is shown by at least 25 
known instances where an ISIL-related suspect was detained either while traveling to an 
airport, or the terminal or gate prior to boarding a plane.219 While a precedent exists for 
individuals being arrested after having left the United States, these cases are rare, 
occurring on only five occasions.220  
D. KEY TAKEAWAYS  
This chapter explored the ISIL threat landscape in the United States, first detailing 
attacks and other incidents where redirected radicals were present before moving into 
how the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence community has responded to the issue. It 
is important to consider the context of the U.S.’ post-9/11 experience with terrorism-
related cases when viewing recent developments and response strategies surrounding the 
ISIL threat. As shown, over 100 terrorism-related cases occurred in the United States in 
the less than two years since the establishment of ISIL. Over the span of the 12 years 
between the 9/11 attacks, and the formation of ISIL (2001–2013), the United States had a 
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cumulative total of 368 terrorism cases.221 In only two years, ISIL has effectively been 
responsible for a significant portion of that prior figure; a development indicative of the 
group’s increasingly wide appeal in the broader global jihadist community. This dramatic 
growth will likely continue to pose a resource challenge for U.S. law enforcement and 
intelligence authorities tasked with the nation’s counterterrorism mission. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
O slaves of Allah, O muwahhiddin! If the tawaghit have shut the door of 
hijrah in your faces, then open the door of jihad in theirs. Make your deed 
a source of their regret. Truly, the smallest act you do in their lands is 
more beloved to us than the biggest act done here; it is more effective for 
us and more harmful to them. If one of you wishes and strives to reach the 
lands of the Islamic State, then each of us wishes to be in your place to 
make examples of the crusaders, day and night, scaring them and 
terrorizing them, until every neighbor fears his neighbor. If one of you is 
unable, then do not make light of throwing a stone at a crusader in his 
land, and do not underestimate any deed, as its consequences are great for 
the mujahidin and its effect is noxious to the disbelievers.222  
~Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ISIL spokesperson and 
external operations figure 
 
A. ISIL IN CHECK AND NO LESS DEADLY 
A great deal can change in two years. For terrorist organizations like ISIL, that 
span of time may appear small, but it can represent an eternity for law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. After the formal declaration of its so-called “Caliphate” by Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi on June 29, 2014, ISIL demonstrated to the world its ability to function 
not just as a jihadist movement but also as a proto-state with unprecedented amounts of 
territory in Iraq and Syria, access to revenue obtained from taxation and extortion within 
its area of control, illegal petroleum sales, and other criminal methods, such as hostage 
taking.223 In response to a sustained campaign of military airstrikes and counterterrorism 
support by a multi-national U.S.-led coalition, ISIL’s capability to project force directly 
into Western Europe and indirectly inspire violence in the United States has been 
demonstrated time and time again.  
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Despite significant setbacks to the group involving leadership takedowns in Iraq 
and Syria, continued infighting among its ranks, internal defections, and adverse hits to 
its revenue stream, the group appears to have recently become even more aggressive in 
the tempo and scale of its external operations.224 Attacks like the November 2015 assault 
in Paris, which left 130 dead, and the March 2016 Brussels bombings that killed 32, 
demonstrated to the world the long-feared scenario of Western foreign fighters returning 
home and putting their deadly tradecraft and combat skills to use in their home 
countries.225  
An intense public debate has centered on the proliferation of ISIL-related attacks 
in Western countries from Germany and Denmark to Belgium and France. Some question 
whether this dangerous development represents a sign of weakness for the terrorist group, 
or an indicator of renewed strength, an opening salvo versus a death rattle. Regardless of 
that debate, continued attacks of this sort aimed at the United States are likely even more 
valuable to the terrorist organization at this time than ever before. The group likely 
recognizes that its continued survival will not allow it to rest on its laurels as the premier 
global violent jihadist organization on the planet, resigned to holding and fending off 
attempts to take back its territorial gains in the Middle East. Rather, continued dramatic 
mass-casualty attacks involving lethal and theatric tactics including hostage taking and 
suicide bombing in the West help to bolster the group’s powerful perception. One of the 
common refrains seen throughout scores of ISIL propaganda documents and videos is the 
phrase “remaining and expanding.”226 Those two words offer insight into the group’s 
strategy of either directing, supporting, or inspiring attacks by its supporters in the West, 
even while under increased counterterrorism pressure. This course of action helps to 
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reaffirm its legitimacy among its adherents while demonstrating its relevance as an 
extremely influential force.227  
The United States has experienced a substantially larger number of ISIL-related 
plots than Australia and Canada. Evidence is indicated by the number of total arrests, 
investigations, and suspects in Chapters III through V. As discussed earlier in Chapter V, 
with at least 11 violent incidents, the United States has also experienced a significantly 
higher number of attempted and successful attacks by homegrown violent extremists. All 
three countries have been impacted by violent incidents carried out by individuals 
described in this research as redirected radicals. One additional unifying trait is apparent 
in their shared experience, neither the United States, Canada, nor Australia have suffered 
a single attack by a returned foreign fighter from ISIL-held territory in Iraq and Syria.  
B. A PROBLEM OF RESOURCES 
FBI Director Comey went on record in May 2016 to provide an update on 
terrorism-related threats facing the United States. He described that the number of 
Americans successfully reaching or attempting to travel to ISIL-held territory is in 
decline, dropping from six per month to roughly one per month over the last year.228 
Despite the observable decline in foreign fighters, the FBI currently has over 1,000 cases 
involving known or suspected extremists nationwide.229 Approximately 800 of those 
cases involve some degree of ISIL influence or connectivity.230 It appears that the 
propaganda released by ISIL, notably the statement by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 
included at this chapter’s opening is being well received in America. That recent message 
gave sanction to exactly the trend of activity observed in this research; HVEs wanting to 
go abroad but being prevented from doing so, and attacking their homeland not out of 
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initial preference but instead out of limited circumstances, now with the blessing of 
ISIL’s senior leadership.  
In the aftermath of the June 2016 Orlando attack, and previous terrorist acts 
carried out by suspects previously known and investigated by U.S. counterterrorism 
authorities, some have raised the question of whether the FBI and other agencies face a 
crisis of resources amid the tremendous and unprecedented number of potential terrorism 
leads being generated.231 Alternatively, perhaps the threshold of information required to 
open a full investigation and follow-up a closed case over the long-term needs reform in 
some areas. The prevalence of redirected radicals in the United States highlights that both 
may be the problem.  
That post-Garland, Texas, attack report by Stratfor discussed earlier in Chapter V 
briefly discussed this issue and claimed the following: 
The FBI will be criticized for not tracking Simpson more carefully and 
stopping the attack before it could be launched. But the truth is that there 
are simply too many potential attackers in the West for the government to 
keep them under constant surveillance. Furthermore, the efforts of the 
government are focused primarily on tracking and countering professional, 
trained terrorist operatives who pose a more severe threat.232  
The figures of potential ISIL-inspired individuals within the United States at 
varying stages of radicalization and with wide degrees of willingness to commit violence 
are without historical equal in the post-9/11 era. The sheer number of open investigations 
has continued to rise without a commensurate increase in intelligence and law 
enforcement personnel to match that challenge. For example, in late 2015, it was reported 
that the FBI was using devoted surveillance personnel to track 48 individuals within the 
United States.233 This figure is relatively small when considering the sheer volume of 
ISIL-related cases reportedly being investigated at the time. These investigations have 
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reportedly used mobile surveillance teams (MSTs) to provide extensive tracking of the 
movements, activities, and associates of known or suspected terrorists.234 The resources 
involved are heavily taxing both in terms of manpower, technical assets, and financial 
funding, often requiring at least 12 investigators.235 The issue has led to some former 
officials in the U.S. intelligence community, notably former CIA Director, Air Force 
General Michael Hayden, to claim that the primary federal law enforcement agency 
charged with the country’s counterterrorism mission, the FBI, is under-resourced.236 
Whether or not the number of potential HVEs has reached a critical mass beyond 
the means of surveillance resources in the United States remains a subject of debate. 
However, looking out from beyond the Garland, Texas attack to the other violent ISIL-
inspired incidents and counterterrorism cases in the United States and elsewhere 
worldwide, several common observed themes may help prevent known extremists from 
falling off the radar in the future and present opportunities to utilize current resources 
more intelligently while better preparing law enforcement personnel for potential hostile 
encounters with likely redirected radical suspects.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this research was to explore shared ISIL threat trends from the 
HVE cases experienced by the United States, Australia, and Canada. On a policy level, 
the findings have provided validation to some of the intelligence and law enforcement 
response strategies while raising serious questions about the risk of others. For 
counterterrorism analysts and officers, the research also has led to some key takeaways, 
which may positively inform future operational considerations and practices.  
Future U.S. government intelligence assessments focusing on ISIL-related 
terrorism concerns and threats would benefit from greater specificity in detailing foreign 
fighter information. Chapters III, IV, and V explored the official foreign fighter metrics 
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and data provided by government agencies of Australia, Canada, and the United States. 
While this information is valuable in developing a broad understanding of the increase or 
decrease in the number of Westerners from these nations traveling to ISIL conflict zones 
at particular points in time, it appears that all three nations produce the information in 
inconsistent ways that fail to provide the clearest picture possible of successful, 
attempted, aspiring, and returned extremist travelers.  
For example, rather than using one broad metric for all extremists that have 
attempted or succeeded in joining ISIL and other terrorist groups abroad, reports should 
instead include the approximate number of individuals with an understood desire to travel 
abroad, those thwarted from doing so, individuals currently fighting or killed overseas, 
and the status of those who had returned. This important context at the strategic policy 
level can help guide the operational prioritization of investigations at the tactical level.  
In numerous cases examined throughout Canada, Australia, and the United States, 
similarity was found among redirected radicals and the timing of their attacks, with at 
least four violent incidents occurring within close proximity to calls for violence in 
Western countries made by ISIL leadership figures. All these incidents involved the 
targeting of uniformed military or law enforcement personnel. For investigators charged 
with investigating terrorism suspects, or encountering individuals of undetermined 
extremist adherence, regular awareness of this threat-related information and familiarity 
with the tactics used by ISIL-inspired individuals has the potential to impact officer 
safety positively. Federal, state, and local security authorities including but not limited to 
military personnel, intelligence officials, law enforcement officers, and first responders 
must be regularly made aware of the current threat environment predominantly posed by 
ISIL and its network of ideological adherents. Statements that focus on encouraging 
extremist supporters in the West to conduct attacks on their homeland rather than 
overseas, especially if coming from proven influential figures who have inspired previous 
violence, like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, should be 
immediately briefed to these communities to enable heightened vigilance. Awareness that 
suspected extremists have consumed propaganda from these and other similar figures 
should raise considerable investigative red flags. The potentially greater likelihood that 
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these individuals may redirect violence on domestic targets merits increased deployment 
of resources and threat mitigation measures by law enforcement authorities. 
The significant uptick in ISIL-related cases within the United States since roughly 
September 2014 will continue to place a heavy burden on federal law enforcement and 
intelligence assets, principally those of the network of 104 JTTFs throughout the United 
States.237 Recognizing this threat, it is advised that additional direct hiring authority be 
provided to the FBI for the purpose of increasing the number of investigators tasked with 
executing its counterterrorism mission. A significant addition of resources will help 
alleviate the current unprecedented demand placed on investigators and reduce the 
number of cases being prematurely closed or deprioritized due to a lack of resources. A 
comparative analysis provided in Chapters III, IV, and V highlighted that the allocation 
of limited resources is an important factor for law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
across Canada, Australia, and the United States, in determining how to process and move 
forward with counterterrorism investigations. This shared struggle appears to have driven 
the need to create prioritization lists for terrorism cases that have centered heavily on 
individuals at risk of traveling overseas or with clear stated intent to carry out attacks on 
their home soil. The gray area that exists in between these two types of extremists is the 
domain of redirected radicals and additional resources may allow for greater scrutiny of 
this dangerous subgroup of ISIL-inspired extremists.  
A comparative analysis revealed that within the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, those investigating counterterrorism cases focusing on ISIL-inspired extremists 
have encountered difficulty monitoring increasingly paranoid and security conscious 
terrorism suspects. In several of the reviewed terrorism cases, notably in New York City 
and Massachusetts, HVEs suspicious of being monitored by law enforcement personnel 
eventually took deliberate hostile actions, including arming themselves with knives and 
deploying counter-surveillance techniques, posing a greater and more imminent threat to 
authorities. Bearing this development in mind, coupled with an apparent increase in the 
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willingness of ISIL’s Western supporters to confront police openly, in addition to new 
staff at the federal level, it is vital that investigative coursework, specifically hostile 
surveillance and counter-surveillance detection training, be regularly expanded to state 
and local support partners in coordination with JTTFs. With adequate training, these 
auxiliary counterterrorism surveillance teams will be able to put the FBI in a better 
position to perform the resource-intensive 24/7 surveillance operations effectively on 
suspected violent extremists at greatest risk of redirecting violence. An abundant pool of 
trained and cleared surveillance officers will also place domestic counterterrorism efforts 
in a more agile position to grow and maneuver deployed resources during periods of 
increased threat. Investigators assigned to ISIL cases involving either suspected 
homegrown violent extremists with an interest in conducting domestic operations, 
aspiring foreign fighters with the likely imminent intention of traveling to Iraq, Syria, or 
other jihadist battlefields abroad, and standard material support for terrorism cases, must 
regularly be instructed to act with extreme caution in any interactions with terrorism 
suspects. Plainclothes investigators should be advised, regardless of assignment, to don 
ballistics vests while on duty, even if contact with an ISIL suspect is not planned or 
anticipated. SWAT team operators or those similarly equipped with full protective gear 
should be the only units authorized to conduct the execution of search warrants, suspect 
apprehensions, and other lawful investigative actions involving interactions with 
terrorism suspects. 
From Montreal and Ottawa to Garland and Melbourne, violent attacks have 
occurred involving Western ISIL supporters who previously expressed an interest in 
becoming foreign fighters, but at some point, were made aware or came to believe that 
they were unable to travel. Rather than simply give up their desire to support the terrorist 
organization, containment policies, such as the revocation or denial of passports, appear 
to have acted as catalytic triggers, making the individuals feel trapped and turning a 
domestic operation into a more acceptable option of last resort. Considering this analysis, 
it has become clear that known or suspected ISIL extremists, particularly aspiring foreign 
fighters, who are the subject of ongoing and future counterterrorism investigations, 
should not be officially notified or otherwise made aware of any changes to their 
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immigration status, passport holding ability, or any other legal factor that could lead to 
the perception that they are not able to travel freely outside of the United States to Syria, 
Iraq, or any other foreign jihadist battlefield. This objective must be a key component of 
investigations from the opening of the case to either the successful facilitation on an 
arrest or the closing of the investigation. Legislative efforts in the United States, such as 
Key Finding Recommendation 21 of the House Committee on Homeland Security’s 
foreign fighters’ report, which explores the revocation of terror suspects’ passports, 
should not be hastily authorized, and may have negative security impacts.238 Rather, the 
United States must seek to strike a balance between containing the risk of an aspiring 
foreign fighter from traveling to receive training overseas and alerting said extremist to a 
point where they feel their only way of supporting ISIL is to conduct a homeland attack. 
Creative and covert law enforcement approaches, particularly clandestine additions to the 
“no-fly list” and other methods are likely counterterrorism alternatives with better odds of 
success.  
A review of terrorist attacks by ISIL extremists over the last two years including 
the 2015 Garland, Texas attack, and the June 2016 Orlando shooting, reveals the 
persistent problem of terrorism suspects falling off the investigative radar or being 
deprioritized as security concerns in the months and years prior to a major operation. 
Similar cases, such as the December 2014 Sydney hostage crisis, highlight a similar 
problem faced by other Western allies. Given the number of attacks that have occurred in 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere involving individuals previously 
known to counterterrorism authorities, and in some cases, investigated and contacted for 
their extremist connections, current policies regarding the length of time a terrorism case 
may remain open, the threshold for closing an investigation, or systemic structures that 
enable suspects to be periodically re-investigated should be explored for areas of reform. 
Considering the similarities of background and shared experiences of the redirected 
radicals observed in violent incidents throughout the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, a suspected extremist’s interest in overseas travel, connections to Western 
foreign fighters, and a range of personal aggravating circumstances including mental 
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illness, family disputes, and financial difficulties should all be weighted heavily in the 
decision to close an investigation. These factors may be interpreted as evidence of a 
suspect’s lack of serious capability or ideological commitment to a terrorist group like 
ISIL, when in reality, the cases studied indicate that they may make an individual even 
more susceptible to rapid radicalization and violent redirection.  
While the current domestic law enforcement counterterrorism strategy in the 
United States has largely proven successful, resulting in a 100% conviction rate in 
terrorism arrests brought to trial. The average sentence in ISIL-related cases has been 
roughly 10 years in prison, and the average age of those convicted is 26 years old.239 
Excluding the possibility of early release, it means that the majority of current convicted 
ISIL extremists will be free from prison before their 40th birthday, making the need for 
research, development, and implementation of long-term programs to counter violent 
extremism and prevent recidivism more important than ever to prevent ISIL convicts 
from engaging in future acts of terrorism. This need is supported by cases, notably in 
Australia, but elsewhere in Western nations, when individuals previously adjudicated for 
crimes went on to commit extremist violence.  
Over the last two years of ISIL’s existence, the United States has suffered a 
greater number of violent incidents involving HVEs who adhered to the ideology of the 
terrorist organization or similar groups, compared to its allies Australia and Canada. 
However, of the cases reviewed in Chapters III, IV, and V, both these nations have 
experienced a comparably higher number of attacks involving ISIL extremists who could 
be classified as redirected radicals. This higher number may in part be due to the 
counterterrorism policy strategy adopted by both Australia and Canada that incorporates 
a combination of elements, such as passport revocation to ban travel. Terrorism suspects 
made aware of these limitations in numerous outlined cases were then more likely to 
conduct violence against their homeland and countrymen.  
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Chapters III and IV explored the unique use of preventative detention measures 
by the governments of Canada and Australia in the form of peace bonds and preventative 
detention orders, respectively. At present, at least one of the suspected ISIL extremists 
who have been subject to these judicial measures was responsible for an act of terrorism 
on their own soil. However, the use of these unique tools is a relatively new phenomenon 
and the detention measures for these individuals, who have not been convicted of a 
terrorism-related crime, are not indefinite. The increased monitoring, social media 
restrictions and other limitations are generally set to phase out after roughly a year for 
terrorism suspects, raising the threat of these ISIL-inspired extremists potentially to 
redirect violence as a result of feeling trapped in their home countries or simply delaying 
hostile actions until an opportunity presents itself when the mobility restrictions expire. 
D. MAKING SENSE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
The current ISIL foreign fighter threat narrative in the United States is potentially 
flawed and broadly generalizes Western sympathizers as those who have traveled abroad 
successfully and are preparing to return home to conduct attacks or endeavor to join ISIL 
overseas with the sole intention of traveling back to their country to conduct attacks. This 
view overlooks the likely threat of aspiring foreign fighters, those who not only seek to 
join ISIL abroad, but also hope to live the rest of their days in Iraq and Syria, with no 
initial expressed desire or interest in conducting homeland operations. This thesis has 
provided a model for understanding these extremist aspirants and the transformative 
threat they pose. Ultimately, when prevented from becoming foreign fighters on the 
battlefield with ISIL, a significant likelihood then exists that these individuals will no 
longer be contented aspirants and will instead commit to attacking their homeland, and 
thus, becoming redirected radicals.  
After a review of relevant literature, and an extensive comparative case study 
analysis of three Western nations with a similar terrorism threat environment, clear 
opportunities exist for reform, which may make the process of identifying the extremists 
at greatest risk of turning their intended support for ISIL overseas into violent action at 
home more effective. As programs that present alternatives to arrest and imprisonment 
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continue to be developed, the U.S. law enforcement community has a challenging 
responsibility to prevent attacks within the current system and deploy resources in an 
intelligent way that maximizes collection, facilitates prosecution, and effectively reduces 
the danger facing the public. This thesis has made clear that not all actions taken during 
the course of a counterterrorism investigation are guaranteed to result in a positive 
outcome, and even the best intentions of preventing extremists from fighting abroad can 
trigger the unintended consequence of them choosing to attack their countrymen and die 
at home.  
Ultimately, law enforcement agencies benefit by being able to control many of the 
levers that can alert aspiring foreign fighters that their plans for overseas travel have been 
disrupted, which thus results in them altering their behavior. In these particular cases, the 
perception by a terrorism suspect of law enforcement inaction is likely a stronger 
preventative resource than overt action. It is paramount that counterterrorism authorities 
be aware of the danger that these individuals pose at every step of an investigation, and 
that officers are supported by government policies that aim not only to prevent the 
potential threat of foreign fighter returnees, but also the proven danger of redirected 
radicals. 
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